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Abstract
We model the financing, cash holdings, and hedging policies of a firm facing fi-
nancing frictions and subject to permanent and transitory cash flow shocks. We show
that permanent and transitory shocks generate distinct, sometimes opposite, effects
on corporate policies and use the model to develop a rich set of empirical predictions.
In our model, correlated permanent and transitory shocks imply less risk, lower cash
savings, and a drop in the value of credit lines. The composition of cash-flow shocks
affects the cash-flow sensitivity of cash, which can be positive or negative. Optimal
hedging of permanent and transitory shocks may involve opposite positions.
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During the past two decades, dynamic corporate finance models have become part of the
mainstream literature in financial economics, providing insights and quantitative guidance
for investment, financing, cash management, or risk management decisions under uncertainty.
Two popular cash flow environments have been used extensively in this literature. In one,
shocks are of permanent nature and cash flows are governed by a geometric Brownian motion
(i.e. their growth rate is normally distributed). This environment has been a cornerstone of
real-options models (see e.g. McDonald and Siegel (1986) or Morellec and Schu¨rhoff (2011))
and dynamic capital structure models (see e.g. Leland (1998) or Strebulaev (2007)). In the
other, shocks are purely transitory and short-term cash flows are modeled by the increments
of an arithmetic Brownian motion (i.e. cash flows are normally distributed). This has
proved useful in models of liquidity management (see e.g. De´camps, Mariotti, Rochet, and
Villeneuve (2011) or Bolton, Chen, and Wang (2011)) and in models of dynamic agency (see
e.g. DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) or Biais, Mariotti, Plantin, and Rochet (2007)).1
Assuming that shocks are either permanent or transitory has the effect of dramatically
simplifying dynamic models. However, corporate cash flows cannot generally be fully de-
scribed using solely transitory or permanent shocks. Many types of firm or market shocks
are transitory and do not affect long-term prospects. Examples include temporary changes
in demand, delays in costumer payments, machine breakdowns, or supply chain disruptions.
But long-term cash flows also change over time due to various firm, industry, or macroe-
conomic shocks that are of permanent nature. Examples include changes in technology,
reductions of trade barriers, or changes in consumer preferences.
By definition, permanent shocks affect not only a firm’s immediate productivity and cash
flows but also its future productivity and cash flows. By contrast, while purely transitory
shocks affect immediate cash flows, they are uninformative about future expected profitabil-
ity. Consequently, corporate policies are likely to respond differently to transitory shocks
1See Strebulaev and Whited (2012) for a recent survey of models based on permanent shocks. See Moreno-
Bromberg and Rochet (2014) for a recent survey of liquidity models based on transitory shocks. See Biais,
Mariotti, and Rochet (2013) for a recent survey of dynamic contracting models. In a recent paper, He (2009)
develops a dynamic agency model with permanent shocks. Abel (2015) constitutes an example of a dynamic
capital structure model with purely transitory shocks only. Bolton, Wang, and Yang (2015) constitutes an
example of a real options model with permanent shocks only and financing frictions.
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than to permanent shocks, and corporate decisions are likely to vary with the relative im-
portance of firms’ exposure to these two sources of uncertainty.2 Our objective in this paper
is therefore twofold. First, we seek to develop a dynamic framework for the cash holdings,
external financing, payout, and risk management decisions of a “financially constrained” firm
subject to both permanent and transitory cash flow shocks. Second, we want to use this
model to shed light on existing empirical results and generate novel testable implications.
We begin our analysis by formulating a dynamic structural model in which a firm faces
financing frictions, in that raising outside funds is costly, and is subject to both permanent
and transitory cash flow shocks. To account for the fundamentally different nature of these
shocks, we model the firm cash flows in the following way. First, cash flows are subject to
profitability shocks that are permanent in nature and governed by a geometric Brownian
motion, as in real options and dynamic capital structure models. Second, for any given
level of profitability, cash flows are also subject to short-term shocks that expose the firm to
potential losses. These short-term cash flow shocks may be purely transitory but they may
also be correlated with permanent shocks. In the model, the losses due to short-term shocks
can be covered either using cash holdings or by raising outside funds at a cost. The firm
may also hedge its exposure to permanent and transitory shocks by investing in financial
derivatives or by changing its exposure to these shocks via asset substitution. When making
liquidity, financing, and hedging decisions, management maximizes shareholder value.
Using this model, we generate two sorts of implications. First, we show that a combina-
tion of transitory and permanent shocks can lead to policy choices that are in stark contrast
with those in models based on a single source of risk. Second, our analysis demonstrates
that transitory and permanent risks have different, often opposing, implications for corpo-
rate policies. Combining them produces implications that are consistent with a number of
stylized facts and allows us to generate a rich set of testable predictions.
2Consider for example a firm facing a positive demand shock. If the shock is purely transitory and the
marginal cost of production is increasing, the firm is likely to use its inventory to meet this increase in
demand and, therefore, the effect of this transitory increase in demand can be spread at the production
stage over several periods. This in turn implies that neither the output price nor the quantity produced will
adjust too much. If instead the shock is permanent in nature, a high demand today implies a high demand
in the future and the shock cannot be smoothed as much. In this case, both output and price (because the
marginal cost of production will be high in the future as well) will adjust more.
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We highlight the main empirical implications. As in standard liquidity management
models in which firms are solely exposed to transitory shocks, financing frictions generate a
precautionary demand for cash in our model, since raising external capital to absorb potential
losses and avoid inefficient closure is costly. A key difference with prior models, however, is
that the value of the firm depends not only on its cash holdings, but also on the value of the
permanent shock. Notably, a unique feature of our model is that the ratio of cash holdings
over profitability (firm size) is the state variable of the firm’s problem. This is consistent
with the approach taken in the empirical literature (see e.g. Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and
Williamson (1999)), but it has not been clearly motivated by theory.
Given that the empirical literature uses a related proxy, it may not seem a notable
observation that “effective cash = cash/profitability”. However, this observation implies
that more profitable firms hold more cash. That is, as the long-term prospects of the firm
improve following positive permanent shocks, the firm becomes more valuable and finds
it optimal to hoard more cash. This observation also implies that a positive permanent
shock has two effects. First, it affects the denominator of the state variable. Future cash
flows go up in expectation so that, holding the cash balance fixed, the firm is now more
constrained. The second effect of a positive permanent shock is on the cash flow today as it
affects the numerator of the state variable, making the firm richer. Intuitively, the negative
effect is more important when the denominator is smaller, i.e. when the firm has more cash.
By contrast, a transitory shock only affects the numerator of the state variable, so that a
positive transitory shock makes the firm richer and less constrained.
We show in the paper that this relation between permanent shocks and target cash
holdings has numerous implications. A first implication is that target cash holdings should
decrease in correlation between short-term and permanent shocks. This is not immediately
expected because two correlated shocks of transitory nature would allow for diversification
if correlation decreased. So cash savings would increase in correlation between transitory
shocks. Intuitively, the firm benefits from increased correlation between short-term and
permanent shocks because it is then able to generate cash flows when they are needed to
maintain scaled cash holdings after positive permanent shocks. A related implication is that
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an increase in the volatility of permanent cash flow shocks can also decrease target cash
holdings. This effect is due to the fact that volatility in permanent cash flow shocks can help
manage liquidity when short-term shocks are positively correlated with permanent shocks.
Our model also predicts that when this correlation is negative, cash savings should increase
with the volatilities of both permanent and transitory cash flow shocks.
Another unique prediction of our model is that target cash holdings should decrease with
the growth rate of transitory shocks but increase with the growth rate of permanent shock,
as an increase in the latter (respectively former) makes it more (respectively less) likely that
the firm will be constrained in the future. We also find that permanent shocks have large
quantitative effects on firm value and optimal policies. With our baseline parameters for
example, permanent shocks increase both firm value and target cash holdings by 44%.
A second set of results concerns the cash-flow sensitivity of cash. In corporate-liquidity
models based solely on purely transitory shocks, the cash-flow sensitivity of cash is either
zero (at the target level of cash reserves) or one (away from the target). In contrast, our
model predicts that firms demonstrate a non-trivial and realistic cash-flow sensitivity of cash,
due to the effects of permanent shocks on target cash holdings. In our model, this sensitivity
increases with financing frictions, consistent with the available evidence. In addition, it is
positive when short-term and permanent shocks are positively correlated, consistent with
Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004), but negative when this correlation is negative,
consistent with Riddick and Whited (2009).
Turning to risk management, we show that derivatives usage should depend on whether
the risk stems from transitory or permanent shocks. Specifically, if futures prices and the
firm’s risk are positively correlated, then hedging transitory shocks involves a short futures
position while hedging permanent shocks may involve a long futures position. That is,
hedging permanent shocks may involve a position not contrary but aligned to the exposure.
In these instances, the firm prefers to increase cash flow volatility to benefit from the increase
cash flow correlation to permanent profitability shocks.
We also show that managing risk either by derivatives or by directly selecting the riski-
ness of assets (i.e. asset substitution) leads to the same outcome if the risk is due to purely
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transitory shocks. However, hedging with derivatives and asset substitution are not equiv-
alent when managing the risk from permanent shocks. This is due to the fact that asset
substitution does not generate immediate cash flows whereas derivatives do. This may not
matter for an unconstrained firm, but it is a fundamental difference for a financially con-
strained firm. One prediction of the model is thus that a firm in distress would engage asset
substitution with respect to permanent shocks but not in derivatives hedging.
Another way for firms to manage their risks is to acquire financial flexibility via a credit
line. Our model shows that the availability of a credit line leads to both a significant decrease
in target cash holdings and a significant increase in firm value, but has little effect on equity
issues. Interestingly, because the correlation between permanent and short-term shocks
reduces firm risk, we also find that the firms or industries that benefit most from credit lines
are those in which permanent and short-term cash flow shocks are negatively correlated.
Lastly, we show that the relation between permanent shocks and target cash holdings
also implies that when firms raise outside funds, the size of equity issues is not constant, but
depends on the firm’s profitability. Notably, a unique prediction of our model is that more
profitable firms should raise more funds when accessing financial markets.
In the last section of the paper, we consider the option to invest in our constrained firm
and show that the combination of financing frictions and transitory shocks delays investment.
This delay is due to two separate effects. First, the cost of external finance increases the cost
of investment, making the investment opportunity less attractive and leading to an increase
in the profitability level required for investment. Second, the combination of transitory
shocks and financing frictions reduces the value of the firm after investment, further delaying
investment. That is, the threat of future cash shortfalls increases future financing costs and
reduces the value of the asset underlying the growth option, thereby leading to late exercise
of the investment opportunity. We show that the effect can be quantitatively important. In
our base case environment for example, investment is triggered for a profitability level that
is 10% higher than in models without transitory shocks and financing frictions.3
3See the early paper of McDonald and Siegel (1986) or the recent contributions of Carlson, Fisher, and
Giammarino (2004, 2010), Lambrecht (2004), Manso (2008), Grenadier and Malenko (2010), or Grenadier
and Malenko (2011). Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and Stokey (2009) provide excellent surveys of this literature.
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Our work advances the strand of research that incorporates financing frictions into dy-
namic models of corporate financial decisions. Recent contributions in this literature include
Bolton, Chen, and Wang (2011, 2013), De´camps, Mariotti, Rochet, and Villeneuve (2011),
Gryglewicz (2011), and Hugonnier, Malamud, and Morellec (2015). A key simplifying as-
sumption in these models is that cash flows are only subject to purely transitory shocks.
That is, none of these papers has permanent shocks together with transitory shocks. We
show in this paper that incorporating permanent shocks in models with financing frictions
leads to a richer set of empirical predictions and helps explain corporate behavior.
As relevant as it is to analyze an integrated framework combining both transitory and
permanent shocks, there are surprisingly only a few attempts in the literature addressing
this problem. Gorbenko and Strebulaev (2010) consider a dynamic model without financing
frictions, in which firm cash flows are subject to both permanent and transitory shocks.
Their study focuses on leverage choices. Our paper instead analyzes liquidity, refinancing,
risk management, and investment policies. Another important difference between the two
papers is that we model transitory shocks with a Brownian process instead of a Poisson
process, which allows us to get a lot of tractability. Grenadier and Malenko (2010) build a
real options model in which firms are uncertain about the permanence of past shocks and
have the option to learn before investing. In their model, there are no financing frictions
and, as a result, no role for cash holdings and no need to optimize financing decisions.
Lastly, our paper relates to the large literature that examines the distinct effects of per-
manent and transitory shocks on economic outcomes. While the decomposition of shocks
between transitory and permanent components has been used productively over the years
in many areas of economics, it has received little attention in corporate finance.4 In a re-
4A number of asset pricing papers (see e.g. Cochrane (1994), Cohen, Gompers, and Vuolteenaho (2002),
Bansal, Dittmar, and Kiku (2008), Garleanu, Kogan, and Panageas (2012a), or Garleanu, Panageas, and Yu
(2012b)) use such a decomposition to analyze stock returns and risk premia on stocks. This decomposition is
also used in market microstructure to analyze price efficiency (see e.g. Glosten and Harris (1988), Brennan
and Subrahmanyam (1996), or Boehmer and Wu (2013)). The literature on income processes also often seeks
to decompose shocks into permanent and transitory components; see e.g. Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston
(2008), Meghir and Pistaferri (2004), or Gottschalk and Moffitt (2009). The decomposition of income shocks
between permanent and transitory components has found interesting applications in the life-cycle portfolio
choice literature; see e.g. Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005). In the time series literature, the permanent-
transitory model is known as the unobserved component decomposition, in which the permanent part is the
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cent empirical study, Chang, Dasgupta, Wong, and Yao (2014) decompose corporate cash
flows into a transitory and a permanent component and show that this decomposition helps
understand how firms allocate cash flows and whether financial constraints matter in this
allocation decision. Lee and Rui (2007) show that such a decomposition also allows de-
termining whether share repurchases are used to pay out cash flows that are potentially
transitory, thus preserving financial flexibility relative to dividends. Guiso, Pistaferri, and
Schivardi (2005) examine the allocation of risk between firms and their workers and show
that firms absorb transitory shocks fully but insure workers against permanent shocks only
partially. Lastly, Byun, Polkovnichenko, and Rebello (2016) examine the separate effects of
persistent and transitory shocks on corporate savings and investment decisions. Our anal-
ysis demonstrates that the distinction between transitory and permanent shocks is relevant
for the larger set of policies that are of interest to financial economists, namely investment,
financing, payout, cash holdings, and risk management policies.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the model. Section 2 solves for the
value and optimal policies of a financially constrained firm. Section 3 derives the model’s
empirical implications with respect to cash savings. Section 4 examines risk management.
Section 5 examines the effects of credit lines. Section 6 derives value of the option to invest
in the firm. Section 7 concludes. Technical developments are gathered in the Appendix.
1 Model
1.1 Assumptions
Throughout the paper, agents are risk neutral and discount cash flows at a constant rate
r > 0. Time is continuous and uncertainty is modeled by a probability space (Ω,F ,F, P )
with the filtration F = {Ft : t ≥ 0}, satisfying the usual conditions.
We consider a firm that owns an option to invest in a risky project. The firm has
full flexibility in the timing of investment but the decision to invest is irreversible. The
direct cost of investment is constant, denoted by I > 0. The project, once completed,
trend and the transitory component is named the cyclical innovation; see Hamilton (1994) chapter 17.
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produces a continuous stream of cash flows that are subject to both permanent and transitory
shocks. Permanent shocks change the long-term prospects of the firm and influence cash flows
permanently by affecting the productivity of assets and firm size. We denote the productivity
of assets by A = (At)t≥0 and assume that it is governed by a geometric Brownian motion:
dAt = µAtdt+ σAAtdW
P
t , (1)
where µ and σA > 0 are constant parameters and W
P = (W Pt )t≥0 is a standard Brownian
motion. In addition to these permanent shocks, cash flows are subject to short-term shocks
that do not necessarily affect long-term prospects. Notably, we consider that operating cash
flows dXt after investment are proportional to At but uncertain and governed by:
dXt = αAtdt+ σXAtdW
X
t , (2)
where α and σX are strictly positive constants and W
X = (WXt )t≥0 is a standard Brownian
motion. WX is allowed to be correlated with W P with correlation coefficient ρ, in that
E[dW Pt dWXt ] = ρdt, with ρ ∈ [−1, 1]. (3)
The dynamics of cash flows can then be rewritten as




1− ρ2dW Tt ), (4)
where W T = (W Tt )t≥0 is a Brownian motion independent from W
P . This decomposition
implies that short-term cash flow shocks dWXt consist of transitory shocks dW
T
t and perma-
nent shocks dW Pt .
5 In what follows, we refer to σX as the volatility of short-term shocks or,
when it does not cause confusion, as the volatility of transitory cash flow shocks.
The permanent nature of innovations in A implies that a unit increase or decrease in A
increases or decreases the expected value of each future cash flow. To illustrate this property,
5One may also interpret WT as a shock to cash flow and WP as a shock to asset value. In our model,
a pure cash flow shock (cash windfall) makes the firm richer but does not make the firm’s assets better. A
pure shock to assets (e.g., discovery of oil reserves) improves the value of the firm’s assets but does not make
the firm richer today. We thank Andrey Malenko for suggesting this interpretation.
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it is useful to consider an environment in which the firm has a frictionless access to capital
markets, as in e.g. Leland (1998) or McDonald and Siegel (1986). In this case, the value of
the firm after investment V FB is simply the present value of all future cash flows:







r − µ. (5)
Equation (5) shows that a shock that changes At via dW
P
t is permanent in the sense that a
unit increase in At increases all future expected levels of profitability by that unit. A shock
to W Tt is transitory because, keeping everything else constant, it has no impact on future
cash flows. That is, when cash flow shocks are not correlated, i.e. when ρ = 0, short-term
cash flow shocks are purely transitory and do not affect future cash flows. When cash flows
shocks are perfectly correlated, i.e. when ρ = 1, any cash flow shock impact all future
cash flows. More generally, cash flow shocks are a combination of transitory and permanent
shocks and the long-run response of cash flows to a current shock depends on the relative
size of the two shocks.
The modeling of cash flows in (1) and (2) encompasses two popular frameworks as special
cases. If µ = σA = 0, we obtain the stationary framework of dynamic agency models (see
DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) or DeMarzo, Fishman, He, and Wang (2012)) and liquidity
management models (see De´camps, Mariotti, Rochet, and Villeneuve (2011), Bolton, Chen,
and Wang (2011), or Hugonnier, Malamud, and Morellec (2015)). In these models, cash flow
shocks are purely transitory. Adding permanent shocks in these models gives rise to two
sources of dynamic uncertainty that makes corporate policies intrinsically richer.
If σX = 0, we obtain the model with time-varying profitability applied extensively in
dynamic capital structure models (see Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001), Hackbarth, Miao,
and Morellec (2006), or Strebulaev (2007)) and real-options models (see Abel and Eberly
(1994), Carlson, Fisher, and Giammarino (2006), or Morellec and Schu¨rhoff (2011)). Our
model with transitory and permanent shocks differs from the latter in that earnings and
asset volatilities differ and innovations in current cash flows are imperfectly correlated with
those in asset values. As discussed in Gorbenko and Strebulaev (2010), these features are
consistent with empirical stylized facts. Another distinguishing feature is that while the
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return on invested capital is constant in these models, in that dXt
At
= αdt, this is not the case





Lastly, our model with permanent and transitory shocks is also related to the asset pric-
ing models of Schwartz and Smith (2000), Garleanu, Panageas, and Yu (2012b), Kogan and
Papanikolaou (2013), and Kogan and Papanikolaou (2014). Notably, Kogan and Papaniko-
laou (2013) and Kogan and Papanikolaou (2014) build models in which any firm’s output
flow is the product of an aggregate productivity shock that follows a geometric Brownian
motion and of firm specific shocks that are governed by (square root) stationary processes.
Garleanu, Panageas, and Yu (2012b) develop a general equilibrium model in which aggre-
gate consumption is the product of a geometric Brownian motion that captures aggregate
productivity growth (embodied technological progress) and a transitory shock that captures
recurrent cyclical components of technological innovations. Schwartz and Smith (2000) de-
velop a model for commodity prices in which the equilibrium commodity price level evolves
according to a geometric Brownian motion and in which short-term deviations from this
equilibrium price revert toward zero following a mean-reverting stationary process.6 Our
model differs from these studies in that cash flows can be negative in our setup (whereas
prices have to remain positive in their setups), consistent with the available evidence.
1.2 Shareholders’ optimization problem
In the absence of short-term shocks, the cash flows of an active firm are given by αAtdt
and are always positive because A is always positive. Short-term shocks expose the firm to
potential losses, that can be covered using cash reserves or by raising outside funds.
6As shown by Schwartz and Smith (2000), empirical models of commodity prices with transitory and per-
manent factors outperform single-factor models with only short-term or long-term effects. See also Mirantes,
Poblacion, and Serna (2015) for evidence on alternative exhaustible resource markets. Both Schwartz and
Smith (2000) and Mirantes, Poblacion, and Serna (2015) use Kalman filter techniques to estimate from the
time series of derivatives prices, the unobservable parameters entering the dynamics of the state variables or
factors. Because of the lower frequency of the data, the empirical corporate finance papers discussed in the
introduction do not rely on Kalman filter techniques. Both Chang, Dasgupta, Wong, and Yao (2014) and
Lee and Rui (2007) employ the approach of Beveridge and Nelson (1981) to decompose cash flows into a
transitory and a permanent component. Like the Kalman filter techniques, the Beveridge-Nelson decomposi-
tion allows evaluating the volatilities of permanent and transitory shocks as well as their correlation. Guiso,
Pistaferri, and Schivardi (2005) and Byun, Polkovnichenko, and Rebello (2016) use yet different empirical
frameworks that impose zero correlation between permanent and transitory shocks. Our paper demonstrates
that this correlation is a key driver of the corporate response to permanent and transitory shocks.
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Specifically, we allow management to retain earnings inside the firm and denote by Mt
the firm’s cash holdings at any time t > 0. We consider that cash reserves earn a rate of
return r − λ inside the firm, where λ > 0 is a cost of holding liquidity. We also allow the
firm to increase its cash holdings or cover operating losses by raising funds in the capital
markets. When raising outside funds at time t, the firm has to pay a proportional cost p > 1
and a fixed cost φAt > 0 so that if the firm raises some amount et from investors, it gets
et/p − φAt. As in Bolton, Chen, and Wang (2011), the fixed cost scales with firm size so
that the firm does not grow out from the fixed cost.7 The net proceeds from equity issues
are then stored in the cash reserve, whose dynamics evolve as:
dMt = (r − λ)Mtdt+ αAtdt+ σXAt(ρdW Pt +
√
1− ρ2dW Tt ) +
dEt
p
− dΦt − dLt, (6)
where Lt, Et, and Φt are non-decreasing processes that respectively represent the cumulative
dividend paid to shareholders, the cumulative gross external financing raised from outside
investors, and the cumulative fixed cost of financing.
Equation (6) is an accounting identity that indicates that cash reserves increase with
the interest earned on cash holdings (first term on the right hand side), the firm’s earnings
(second and third terms), and outside financing (fourth term), and decrease with financing
costs (fifth term) and dividends (last term). In this equation, the cumulative gross financing
raised from investors Et and the cumulative fixed cost of financing Φt are defined as Et =∑∞
n=1 en1τn≤t and Φt =
∑∞
n=1 φAτn1τn≤t, for some increasing sequence of stopping times
(τn)
∞
n=1 that represent the dates at which the firm raises external funds and some sequence
of nonnegative random variables (en)
∞
n=1 that represent the gross financing amounts.
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The firm can abandon its assets at any time after investment by distributing all of
its cash to shareholders. Alternatively, it can be liquidated if its cash buffer reaches zero
7The scaling of the fixed refinancing cost can be motivated by modeling this cost as in Hugonnier,
Malamud, and Morellec (2015). Suppose that new investors have some bargaining power in the division of
the surplus created at refinancing. A Nash-bargaining solution would allocate a share of this surplus to new
investors. As will become clear in Section 2 below, the total surplus at refinancing is linear in profitability
At. This approach would generate a fixed refinancing cost φAt with an endogenous φ.
8Technically, ((τn)n≥1, (en)n≥1, L) belongs to the set A of admissible policies if and only if (τn)n≥1 is a
non-decreasing sequence of F-adapted stopping times, (en)n≥1 is a sequence of nonnegative (Fτn)n≥1-adapted
random variables, and L is a non-decreasing F-adapted and right-continuous process with L0 ≥ 0.
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following a series of negative shocks and raising outside funds to cover the shortfall is too
costly. We consider that the liquidation value of assets represents a fraction ω < 1 of their
unconstrained value V FB(a) plus current cash holdings. The liquidation time is then defined
by τ0 ≡ {t ≥ 0 |Mt = 0}. If τ0 =∞, the firm never chooses to liquidate.
The objective of management in an active firm is to choose the dividend, financing, and
default policies that maximize shareholder value. (We also analyze risk management in
section 4 and the initial investment decision in section 6.) There are two state variables for
shareholders’ optimization problem after investment: Profitability At and the cash balance
Mt. We can thus write this problem as:





e−rt(dLt − dEt) + e−rτ0
(
ωαAτ0
r − µ +Mτ0
)]
. (7)
The first term on the right hand side of equation (7) represents the present value of payments
to incumbent shareholders until the liquidation time τ0, net of the claim of new investors on
future cash flows. The second term represents the firm’s discounted liquidation value.
2 Model solution
In this section, we base our analysis of shareholders’ problem (7) on heuristic arguments.
These arguments are formalized in the Appendix.
To solve problem (7) and find the value of an active firm facing financing frictions, we
need to determine the financing, payout, and liquidation policies that maximize shareholder
value after investment. Consider first financing and liquidation decisions. Because of the
fixed cost of financing, it is natural to conjecture that it is optimal for shareholders to delay
equity issues as much as possible. That is, if any issuance activity takes place, this must be
when cash holdings drop down to zero, so as to avoid liquidation. At this point, the firm
either issues shares if the fixed cost of financing is not too high or it liquidates. Consider next
payout decisions. In the model, cash reserves allow the firm to reduce refinancing costs or
the risk of inefficient liquidation. As a result, the benefit of an additional dollar retained in
the firm is decreasing in cash reserves. Since keeping cash inside the firm entails a constant
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opportunity cost λ on any dollar saved, we conjecture that the optimal payout policy is
characterized by a profitability-dependent target cash level m∗(a) where the marginal cost
and benefit of cash holdings are equalized and it is optimal to start paying dividends.
To verify this conjecture and solve for firm value, we first consider the region (0,m∗(a))
over which it is optimal to retain earnings. In this region, the firm does not deliver any cash
flow to shareholders and equity value satisfies:











where Vx denote the first-order derivative of the function V with respect to x and Vxy
denotes the second-order partial derivative of V with respect to x and y. The left-hand side
of this equation represents the required rate of return for investing in the firm’s equity. The
right-hand side is the expected change in equity value in the region where the firm retains
earnings. The first two terms capture the effects of changes in profitability (µa) and cash
savings (αa+ (r − λ)m) on equity value. The last term captures the effects of volatility in
cash flows and productivity. In our model with permanent and transitory shocks, changes
in productivity affect not only the value of the firm but also the value of cash reserves to
shareholders in that Vam(a,m) 6= 0.
Equation (9) is solved subject to the following boundary conditions. First, when cash
holdings exceed the target level m∗(a), the firm places no premium on internal funds and it
is optimal to make a lump sum payment m−m∗(a) to shareholders. As a result, we have
V (a,m) = V (a,m∗(a)) +m−m∗(a), (9)
for all m ≥ m∗(a). Substracting V (a,m∗(a)) from both sides of this equation, dividing by
m−m∗(a), and taking the limit as m tends to m∗(a) yields the condition
Vm(a,m
∗(a)) = 1. (10)
As V is assumed to be C2 across the boundary function m∗(a), condition (10) in turn implies
13
the high-contact condition (see Dumas (1992)):
Vmm(a,m
∗(a)) = 0, (11)
that determines the location of the optimal dividend boundary function.
When the fixed cost of external finance φ is not too large, the firm raises funds every
time its cash buffer is depleted. In this case, the value-matching condition at zero is
V (a, 0) = V (a,m(a))− pm(a)− pφa, (12)
so that the value of shareholders’ claim when raising outside financing is equal to the con-
tinuation value of equity (first term on the right-hand side) net of the claim of new investors
on future cash flows (second term) and issuance costs (third term). The value-maximizing
issue size m(a) is then determined by the first-order condition:
Vm(a,m(a)) = p, (13)
which ensures that the marginal cost of outside funds is equal to the marginal benefits of cash
holdings at the post-issuance level of cash reserves. An important implication of equation
(13) is that the optimal size of equity issues is not constant as in previous contributions, but
depends on the firm’s productivity. Lastly, when the fixed cost of financing makes an equity
issue unattractive, liquidation is optimal at m = 0 and we have:
V (a, 0) =
ωαa
r − µ. (14)
While there are two state variables for shareholders’ optimization problem (9)-(14), this
problem is homogeneous of degree one in a and m. We can thus write:
V (a,m) = aV (1,m/a) ≡ aF (c), (15)
where c ≡ m
a
represents the scaled cash holdings of the firm and F (c) is the scaled value
function. Using this observation, the boundary conditions can be rewritten in terms of the
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scaled value function F as a standard free boundary problem with only one state variable,
the scaled cash holdings of the firm c that evolve between the liquidation/refinancing trigger
located at zero and the payout trigger c∗.
Importantly, this scaling feature of the model also permits a better understanding of
the distinct effects of permanent and transitory shocks on optimal policies and firm value.
Notably, an application of Girsanov’s theorem and Itoˆ’s formula implies that the dynamics
of scaled cash holdings are given by (see the Appendix):
dCt = (α + Ct(r − λ− µ)) dt+σX
√






Consistent with equations (1), (2), and (6), equation (16) shows that the average scaled cash
flow per unit of time is α dt and that the rate of return earned on scaled cash reserves per
unit of time is (r − λ − µ) dt, where µ represents the expected growth rate of the scaling
factor. The term
Σ(c) = σ2X(1− ρ2) + (ρσX − CtσA)2, (17)
represents the squared volatility of scaled cash holdings. The first term on the right hand
side of (17) is constant and reflects the impact of transitory shocks. The second term is a
function of c and reflects the impact of permanent shocks. In models with transitory shocks
only, the volatility of cash holdings is constant and coincides with the volatility σX of cash
flows (this corresponds to the case σA = µ = ρ = 0). Incorporating permanent shocks
in these models leads to an endogenous volatility that depends on the level of scaled cash
holdings c and the correlation coefficient ρ between short-term and permanent shocks.
The key observation is that a permanent shock has two, possibly opposing, effects on
scaled cash holdings. Specifically, a positive permanent shock (dW˜ Pt > 0) moves the firm’s
cash reserves closer to the target cash level c∗ when ρ > 0 (ρσXdW˜ Pt > 0) and away from
c∗ when ρ < 0 (ρσXdW˜ Pt < 0). At the same time, a positive permanent shock makes assets
more valuable, leading to an increase in the precautionary demand for cash and to a greater
distance between current cash reserves and the target level (−cσAdW˜ Pt < 0 ). This latter
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effect is the strongest when the positive permanent shock has little effect on the cash flow
today (low ρ) and if the firm is relatively cash rich (high c). The two effects of permanent
shocks imply a potentially non-monotonic behavior of the volatility of scaled cash holdings
with respect to the deep parameters of the model ρ, σX , and σA. As we show below, this
observation leads to new comparative statics results on target cash holdings (see section 3)
and has important consequences for risk management (see section 4) and the value of credit
lines (see section 5). Lastly, as in previous models with financing frictions, positive transitory
shocks (i.e. dW Tt > 0) have no effects on future cash flows and unambiguously bring the firm
closer to the target level of cash reserves c∗, making the firm richer and less constrained.
We can now follow the same steps as above to derive shareholders’ modified optimization




F ′′(c), Va(a,m) = F (c)− cF ′(c), Vaa(a,m) = c2a F ′′(c), and Vam(a,m) = − caF ′′(c). Plugging
these expressions in equation (9) shows that the scaled value function F (c) satisfies
(r − µ)F (c) = (α + c(r − λ− µ))F ′(c) + 1
2
(σ2Ac
2 − 2ρσAσXc+ σ2X)F ′′(c), (18)
in the earnings retention region (0, c∗). The left hand side of this equation represents the rate
of return required by shareholders for investing in the firm. The right hand side represents
the expected change in the scaled value function in the region where the firm retains earnings.
Consistent with equation (16), the expression α+ c(r− µ− λ) in front of F ′(c) corresponds
to the sum of the mean cash flow rate α and the instantaneous return on cash holdings per
unit of invested capital c(r − µ − λ). The expression in front of F ′′(c) corresponds to the
squared volatility Σ(c) of the scaled cash holdings process Ct, defined in equation (17).
Equation (18) is solved subject to the following boundary conditions. First, in the payout
region c > c∗, the firm pays out any cash in excess of c∗ and we have
F (c) = F (c∗) + c− c∗. (19)
Subtracting F (c∗) from both sides of this equation, dividing by c− c∗, and taking the limit
as c tends to c∗ shows that F (c) satisfies the following value-matching and high-contact
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conditions at the optimal payout trigger c∗:
F ′(c∗) = 1, (20)
F ′′(c∗) = 0. (21)
Additionally, when the firm runs out of cash, shareholders can either refinance or liquidate
assets. As a result, the scaled value function satisfies








When refinancing at zero is optimal, scaled cash holdings after refinancing c are given by
the solution to the first-order condition:
F ′(c) = p. (23)
Before solving shareholders’ problem, we can plug the value-matching and high-contact
conditions (20)-(21) in equation (18) to determine the value of the firm at the target level
of scaled cash holdings c∗. This shows that equity value satisfies
V (a,m∗(a)) = aF (c∗) =
αa






Together with equation (5), equation (24) implies that equity value in a constrained firm
holding m∗(a) units of cash is equal to the first best equity value minus the cost of holding
liquidity, which is the product of the target level of cash holdings m∗(a) and the present
value of the unit cost of holding cash λ
r−µ .
The following proposition summarizes these results and characterizes shareholders’ opti-
mal policies and value function after investment.
Proposition 1. Consider a firm facing financing frictions (φ > 0, p > 1), costs of carrying
cash (λ > 0), and imperfectly correlated permanent and short-term cash flow shocks (ρ < 1).
1. The value of the firm, V (m, a) solving problem (7), satisfies the relation V (m, a) =
aF (m
a
), where (F, c∗) is the unique solution to the system (18)-(23).
17
2. The function F (c), where c ≡ m
a
, is increasing and concave over (0,∞). F ′(c) is greater
than one in the earnings retention region (0, c∗), where c∗ ≡ inf{c > 0 |F ′(c) = 1},
and equal to 1 in the payout region c ∈ [c∗,∞).
3. If financing frictions are large, it is never optimal to issue new shares after investment,
F (0) = ωα
r−µ , and the firm is liquidated as soon as it runs out of cash.
4. If financing frictions are low, F (0) > ωα
r−µ and it is optimal to raise a dollar amount
e∗n = p(c+φ)Aτn at each time τn at which the firm runs out of cash, where c ≡ (F ′)−1(p).
5. When m ∈ (0,m∗(a)), the marginal value of cash is increasing in profitability. Any cash
held in excess of the dividend boundary function m∗(a) = c∗a is paid out to shareholders.
Payments are made to shareholders at each time τ satisfying Mτ = c
∗Aτ .
Proposition 1 delivers several results. First, as in previous dynamic models with financing
frictions (such as Bolton, Chen, and Wang (2011) or De´camps, Mariotti, Rochet, and Vil-
leneuve (2011)), firm value is concave in cash reserves. This implies that it is never optimal
for shareholders to increase the risk of (scaled) cash reserves. Indeed, if the firm incurs a
series of shocks that deplete its cash reserves, it incurs some cost to raising external funds.
To avoid these costs and preserve equity value, the firm behaves in a risk-averse fashion.
Second, Proposition 1 shows that when the cost of external funds is not too high, it is
optimal for shareholders to refinance when the firm’s cash reserves are depleted. In addition,
the optimal issue size depends on the profitability of assets at the time τn of the equity issue
and is given by e∗n = p(c + φ)Aτn . Thus, a unique feature of our model is that the size of
equity issues is not constant. Rather, more profitable firms make larger equity issues.
Third, prior research has shown that the marginal value of cash should be decreasing
in cash reserves and increasing in financing frictions (see e.g. De´camps, Mariotti, Rochet,
and Villeneuve (2011)). Proposition 1 shows that the marginal value of cash should also be
increasing in profitability (firm size), in that Vam > 0. We show below that this result has
important consequences for optimal cash holdings and risk management policies.
Fourth, Proposition 1 shows that cash reserves are optimally reflected down at m∗(a) =
c∗a. When cash reserves exceed m∗(a), the firm is fully capitalized and places no premium on
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internal funds, so that it is optimal to make a lump sum payment m−m∗(a) to shareholders.
As we show in section 3.1 below, the desired level of reserves results from the trade-off
between the cost of raising funds and the cost of holding liquid reserves and reflects the
firm’s exposure to permanent and transitory cash flow shocks.
3 Model analysis
3.1 Optimal cash holdings and the value of a constrained firm
Do transitory and permanent shocks have qualitatively the same effects on firm value and
optimal policies? To answer this question, we examine in this section the effects of the
parameters driving the dynamics of transitory and permanent shocks on the value of a
constrained firm F (c) and target cash holdings c∗.
The following lemma derives comparative statics with respect to an exogenous parameter
θ ∈ {σX , σA, ρ, φ, p, α, µ}, on which we will base our empirical predictions. To make the
dependence of F and c∗ on θ explicit, we write F = F (., θ) and c∗ = c∗(θ). Focusing on the
refinancing case (results for the liquidation case are in the Appendix), we have that:
Proposition 2. The following holds:
1. Firm value satisfies
∂F
∂p
(c, p) < 0,
∂F
∂φ
(c, φ) < 0,
∂F
∂µ
(c, µ) > 0,
∂F
∂α
(c, α) > 0, and
∂F
∂ρ
(c, ρ) > 0.
















Several results follow from Proposition 2. First, firm value decreases and the target level of
cash reserves increases with financing frictions (p and φ), as in models with purely transitory
shocks only (see e.g. De´camps, Mariotti, Rochet, and Villeneuve (2011) or Hugonnier,
Malamud, and Morellec (2015)). Second, both the growth rate of profitability µ and the
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mean cash flow rate α increase firm value. Interestingly, however, while target cash reserves
increase with the growth rate of the permanent shock µ, they decrease with the mean cash
flow rate α. To understand these effects, it is important to recall that the trend in the
dynamics of scaled cash holdings (α+Ct(r−λ−µ)) is increasing α and decreasing µ. When
the mean cash flow rate α increases, it becomes less likely that scaled cash holdings fall to
zero and the firm optimally decreases its target cash level. However, when the growth rate
µ of permanent shocks increases, scaled cash holdings decrease and it becomes more likely
that they will reach zero, implying an increase of optimal scaled cash holdings. This in turn
implies that our model has opposite predictions for the effects of an increase in the mean of
transitory and permanent shocks on target cash holdings.
Third, Proposition 2 shows that the effect of correlation between short-term and perma-
nent shocks ρ on firm value is unambiguously positive. It is not immediately expected that
firm value increases in ρ. Indeed, if the firm faced two shocks of transitory nature, the result
would be opposite. Lower correlation of two transitory shocks would allow for diversification
and firm value would decrease in correlation between transitory shocks. Our result shows
that correlation between short-term and permanent shocks works differently.
To understand why firm value increases with the correlation between short-term and
permanent shocks ρ, think about a firm hit by a positive permanent shock. Its expected size
increases and, in order to maintain scaled cash holdings, the firm needs to increase (unscaled)
cash holdings. If short-term shocks are positively correlated with permanent shocks, in
expectation cash flows temporarily increase and the firm has the means to increase cash
holdings.9 If short-term shocks are not correlated with permanent shocks, the firm may not
be able to do so and its value will benefit less from the positive permanent shock. It is also
interesting to observe that an increase in the correlation between shocks decreases target
cash holdings. The intuition for the negative effect of the correlation between short-term
9In general, the correlation coefficient ρ between short-term and permanent cash flow shocks can be
positive or negative. Examples of a negative correlation include decisions to invest in R&D or to sell assets.
When the firm sells assets today, it experiences a positive cash flow shock. However, it also decreases
permanently future cash flows. Examples of positive correlation include price changes due to the exhaustion
of existing supply of a commodity or improving technology for the production and discovery of a commodity.
Chang, Dasgupta, Wong, and Yao (2014) estimate that for firms listed in the Compustat Industrial Annual
files between 1971 and 2011, the correlation between short-term and permanent cash flow shocks is negative.
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and permanent shocks is that with higher correlation the firm gets positive cash flows shocks
when they are needed to maintain scaled cash holdings, so that target cash holdings can be
lower. This prediction is unique to our model.
The effects of volatility on firm value and cash holdings are more difficult to characterize.
Applying Proposition 7 in the Appendix, we can measure the effect of the volatility of short-
term shocks σX on the (scaled) value of an active firm. Keeping correlation ρ constant, σX
is also a measure of the volatility of transitory shocks. Notably, we have that:
∂F
∂σX
(c, σX) = Ec
[∫ τ0
0






Given that the function F (c) is concave, we have that ∂F (c)
∂σX
< 0 if ρ ≤ 0. For ρ ∈ (0, 1),
the sign of ∂F (c)
∂σX
is not immediately clear. However, numerical simulations suggest that the
effect of increased volatility of short-term shocks on firm value is negative, consistent with
previous literature (see e.g. De´camps, Mariotti, Rochet, and Villeneuve (2011)).10
Consider next the effect of the volatility of permanent shocks on firm value. Applying
Proposition 7 in the Appendix, we have:
∂F
∂σA
(c, σA) = Ec
[∫ τ0
0






Clearly, this equation shows that ∂F (c)
∂σA
< 0 if ρ ≤ 0. When ρ ∈ (0, 1), the effect of an
increase in the volatility of permanent shocks on firm value is ambiguous. The reason is that
firm value decreases in the volatility of scaled cash holdings c, and σA may either increase
or decrease this volatility. Indeed, as shown by equation (16), the instantaneous variance
of c is σ2Ac
2 − 2ρσAσXc + σ2X . Its derivative with respect to σA is 2σAc2 − 2ρσXc. This in
turn implies that the volatility of permanent shocks may increase or decrease the volatility
of scaled cash holdings, and hence target cash holdings, depending on the level of the cash




. That is, because liquidity management aims at reducing firm
risk, target cash holdings increase with σA when c ≥ ρσXσA .
10It is clear from equation (25) that c∗ ≤ σXρσA is a sufficient condition for the negative derivative with
respect to σX when ρ > 0. The inequality c
∗ ≤ σXρσA always holds at our baseline parameter values. Despite
extensive simulation, we have not been able to find any instance of a positive effect of σX on F when ρ > 0.
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To examine the effects of volatility on target cash holdings, we can use the relation:
dc∗(θ)
dθ






















> 0 if ρ ≤ 0, and ∂c∗
∂σX
> 0 and ∂c
∗
∂σA
≷ 0 if ρ ∈ (0, 1). Interestingly, Chang,
Dasgupta, Wong, and Yao (2014) decompose corporate cash flows into a transitory and a
permanent component and show that for firms listed in the Compustat Industrial Annual
files between 1971 and 2011, the correlation between these shocks is negative. Using the
same date, Byun, Polkovnichenko, and Rebello (2016) find that “firms increase cash savings
in response to increased uncertainty arising from both persistent and transitory shocks.”
This empirical result is consistent with our prediction that cash holdings should increase
with σA and σX when ρ < 0. It is again interesting to observe that our model predicts that
if ρ was sufficiently positive in some industries, then the relation between cash savings and
the volatility of permanent shocks σA could become negative.
For completeness, Figure 1 plots target cash holdings c∗ and the optimal issue size c as
functions of the volatilities of short-term shocks σX and permanent shocks σA, the correlation
between shocks ρ, the fixed and proportional financing costs φ and p, and the carry cost of
cash λ. These panels confirm the above comparative statics results. They also show that
the size of equity issues should increase with the fixed cost of financing (since the benefit of
issuing equity must exceed φ) and decrease with the proportional cost of financing (since firm
value is concave and F ′(c) = p). As in prior models, the effects of the other parameters on
the optimal size of equity issues c mirror those of these parameters on target cash holdings.
The question we ask next is whether permanent shocks have non-trivial quantitative
effects.11 To answer this question, we examine the predictions of the model for the firm’s
financing and cash holdings policies. To do so, we select parameters that match previous
studies. Notably, following models with transitory shocks only (e.g. Bolton, Chen, and
Wang (2013)), we set the risk-free rate to r = 3%, the mean cash flow rate to α = 0.18,
11The analysis presented here is not intended to substitute for a more detailed quantitative study, but
serves to highlight the effects of including or omitting permanent shocks in dynamic corporate finance models.
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Proportional financing cost, p
Notes. Figure 1 plots target cash holdings c∗ (solid curves) and the scaled issuance size c (dashed
curves) in the refinancing case. Input parameter values are given in Table 1.
the volatility of short-term shocks to σX = 0.12, and the carry cost of cash to λ = 0.02.
Financing costs are set equal to φ = 0.002 and p = 1.06, implying that the firm pays a
financing cost of 10.4% when issuing equity. The parameters of the permanent shocks are
set equal to µ = 0.01 and σA = 0.25, consistent with Morellec, Nikolov, and Schu¨rhoff (2012).
The correlation between transitory and permanent shocks is set to ρ = −0.21, consistent
with Chang, Dasgupta, Wong, and Yao (2014).12 Lastly, we base the value of liquidation
12While the correlation coefficient ρ affects the persistence of cash flows, it should not be confused with
the cash flow autocorrelation. We have simulated daily cash flows for 100 firms over 1000 years using our
cash flow specification (4) and our base case parameters and run an AR(1) regression of annual cash flows
(CF (t+ 1) = α + βCF (t) + (t+ 1)). The coefficient β obtained in the AR(1) regression on our simulated
data is 0.6526, which matches the empirical estimates of 0.65 obtained by Frankel and Litov (2009) for the
autocorrelation of annual cash flows for COMPUSTAT firms between 1984 and 2004. In our model, changing
the correlation coefficient ρ changes autocorrelation, but autocorrelation of cash flows is mostly driven by
the scale of the permanent shock relative to the transitory shock.
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Table 1: Parameter values and variables
Variable Symbol Parameter Symbol Value
Cash holdings M Growth rate of asset productivity µ 0.01
Scaled cash holdings C Mean rate of cash flows α 0.18
Asset productivity/size A Volatility of permanent shocks σA 0.25
Cumulative cash flows X Volatility of short-term shocks σX 0.12
Cumulative payout L Correlation between shocks ρ -0.21
Cumulative external financing E Riskfree rate r 0.03
Cumulative fixed financing cost Φ Carry cost of liquidity λ 0.02
Active firm value V Proportional financing cost p 1.06
Scaled active firm value F Fixed financing cost φ 0.002
Investment option value G Asset liquidation-value ratio ω 0.55
Payout boundary c∗ Investment cost I 10
Financing target c Credit line spread ξ 0.015
costs on Glover (2016) and set 1− ω = 45%.
Figure 2 shows the effects of introducing time-varying profitability via permanent shocks
in a dynamic model with financing frictions. To better understand the sources of changes,
separate plots are shown in which we first introduce a positive drift only (Panel A with
µ = 0.01 and σA = 0), then a positive volatility only (Panel B with µ = 0 and σA = 0.25),
and finally in which we combine both drift and volatility effects (Panel C with µ = 0.01 and
σA = 0.25). Introducing a positive growth in cash flows is similar to introducing a capital
stock that appreciates deterministically at the rate µ. As a result of this drift in cash flows,
firm value is increased by 46% at the target level of cash reserves. However, target (scaled)
cash holdings are much less affected by the introduction of a permanent drift (an increase
by less than 5%) as risk does not change.
By contrast, Figure 2 shows that adding volatility in A changes the target level of scaled
cash holdings significantly without having a material effect on the value of the firm. In our
base case parametrization for example, optimal cash holdings rise by 34% since the volatility
of scaled cash holdings is increased by the introduction of volatility in A (in that we have√
σ2Ac
2 − 2ρσAσXc+ σ2X > σX over the relevant range). As shown by the figure, the joint
effect of µ and σA is substantial on both firm value (an increase by 44% at the target) and
target cash holdings (an increase by 44%).
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Figure 2: The effects of permanent shocks with liquidation
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B. Effect of volatility σA
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C. Joint effect of µ and σA
Notes. Figure 2 plots firm value and target cash holdings in the liquidation case. The dashed curves
represent the case with only transitory shocks (σA = µ = 0) in all the panels. The solid curves are
with permanent shocks, with µ = 0.01 and σA = 0 in Panel A, µ = 0 and σA = 0.25 in Panel B,
and µ = 0.01 and σA = 0.25 in Panel C. In all the cases, the vertical lines depict the target scaled
cash holdings c∗. Input parameter values are given in Table 1.
Figure 3 shows that similar results obtain in the refinancing case. Again the drift µ of
permanent shocks affects mostly the value function and has little impact on optimal policies.
The volatility σA of permanent shocks significantly affects optimal policies but has almost
no impact on the value function.
3.2 Cash-flow sensitivity of cash
Corporate liquidity models featuring solely transitory shocks characterize optimal cash hold-
ings and dividend policies using a constant target level of cash holdings (see e.g. Bolton,
Chen, and Wang (2011), De´camps, Mariotti, Rochet, and Villeneuve (2011), or Hugonnier,
Malamud, and Morellec (2015)). This generates the prediction that firms at the target dis-
tribute all positive cash flows or, equivalently, that cash holdings are insensitive to cash
flows. As firms off the target retain all earnings, the predicted propensity to save from cash
flows is either one or zero. Our model generates a more realistic firm behavior at the target
cash level and provides an explicit measure of the cash-flow sensitivity of cash.
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Scaled cash holdings, c






Scaled cash holdings, c
C. Joint effect of µ and σA
Notes. Figure 3 plots firm value and target cash holdings in the refinancing case. The dashed
curves represent the case with only transitory shocks (σA = µ = 0) in all panels. The solid curves
are with permanent shocks, with µ = 0.01 and σA = 0 in Panel A, µ = 0 and σA = 0.25 in Panel
B, and µ = 0.01 and σA = 0.25 in Panel C. The vertical lines depict the scaled issue size c and
target scaled cash holdings c∗. Input parameter values are as in Table 1.
To illustrate this feature, suppose that cash holdings are at the target level so that Mt =
c∗At. For our model, this is a most relevant assumption since the bulk of the probability mass
of the stationary distribution of cash holdings is at the target level.13 Upon the realization
of a cash flow shock dXt, profitability At changes in expectation by
E[dAt|dXt] = µAtdt+ σAAt ρ
σXAt
(dXt − αAtdt). (28)












13The concentration of cash holdings close to the target level arises because the optimal payout policy is
to reflect cash reserves at the target and the optimal financing policy is to go back to the target level of cash
reserves when accessing external capital markets. See also Figure 5 in Bolton, Chen, and Wang (2011). Note
that in these models we can only compute the stationary distribution of cash holdings for the refinancing
case since, in the liquidation case, the firm liquidates with probability 1.
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As the firm may not be able to stay at the target after a positive shock if this sensitivity
exceeds 1 and may have excess cash after a negative shock if the sensitivity is less than 1, the
sensitivity of actual cash holdings to positive shocks is + = min{, 1} and to negative shocks
is − = max{, 1}. It should be stressed that  measures the sensitivity in expectation, as one
would obtain by regressing cash flows on cash holdings. An advantage of our bi-dimensional
model is that individual realizations of cash flows are not tightly linked to changes in cash
holdings whenever ρ < 1, consistent with the observed behavior of firms.
When permanent and short-term shocks are positively related (i.e. ρ > 0), the sensitivity
of cash holdings to cash flow shocks is driven by the positive relation between profitability and
the marginal value of cash (i.e. Vam = − caF ′′(c) ≥ 0), which implies that the firm optimally
retains a part of a positive cash flow shock if profitability increases. For this mechanism to
work, a cash flow shock needs to be related to changes in profitability in expectation. Without
permanent shocks (i.e. σA = 0) or without correlation between permanent and short-term
shocks (i.e. ρ = 0), the cash-flow sensitivity of cash  is zero. As shown by equation (30),
the sensitivity  depends directly on the parameters of transitory and permanent shocks,
ρ, σA, and σX , and indirectly on the other parameters of the model via the target level
of cash holdings c∗. In particular, since c∗ increases in the cost of refinancing, the cash-
flow sensitivity of cash increases in external financing frictions, consistent with Almeida,
Campello, and Weisbach (2004) and Riddick and Whited (2009).
For firms or industries in which permanent and short-term shocks are negatively related
(i.e. ρ < 0), our model predicts that the cash flow sensitivity of cash should be negative.
Interestingly, Chang, Dasgupta, Wong, and Yao (2014) find that for U.S. nonfinancial firms
listed in the Compustat Industrial Annual files between 1971 and 2011, this correlation is
on average negative. Using data on U.S. nonfinancial firms between 1972 to 2006, Riddick
and Whited (2009) find that the sensitivity of saving to cash flow is negative.
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3.3 Fixed issuance costs
We conclude this section with a discussion of the role of the scalability in a in our model.
Many firm variables scale up as the firm grows and becomes more productive and profitable.
We have used this observation to motivate our assumption that the fixed refinancing cost is
proportional to the firm’s profitability a. As shown in Section 2, the ratio of cash holdings
over profitability is the unique state variable for the firm’s problem in this case and the firm’s
optimal policies can be fully characterized; see Proposition 1.
Suppose now that the fixed issuance cost is constant and does not depend on firm prof-
itability a, so that the average equity issuance cost is lower for larger firms. Shareholders’
optimization problem then involves a difficult mixed control and stopping problem with two
state variables, cash reserves m and profitability a. With a constant fixed cost φ, liquidation
should be optimal as profitability a and firm value approach 0. As profitability a increases,
the firm effectively outgrows the fixed issuance cost φ and its optimal policy should converge
to that of a firm with only proportional issuance costs. Our model gives the optimal policy
with only proportional costs (φ = 0 and p > 1), in which the optimal issue size is m(a) = 0
and target cash reserves are m∗(a) = c∗a for a constant c∗. Importantly, irrespective of the
modeling of the fixed financing cost, we expect that constrained firms with high profitability
will build up large liquid reserves to reduce the likelihood that a pure cash flow shock triggers
liquidation despite the high value of their assets. This suggests that, in this case too, target
cash holdings should be increasing in profitability, as established in Proposition 1.
4 Risk management
In our model, financing frictions imply that firm value is concave and that management may
wish to reduce risk by engaging in hedging strategies. In addition, because firm cash flows
are subject to permanent and transitory shocks that have different effects on the volatility of
scaled cash holdings, the management of these two sources of risk may imply substantially
different hedging strategies. To investigate these issues, we assume that the firm manages its
risk exposure using derivatives such as futures contracts as in Bolton, Chen, and Wang (2011)
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and Hugonnier, Malamud, and Morellec (2015). Notably, we consider futures contracts with
price Yt governed by:
dYt = σY YtdZt, (31)
where σY is a positive constant and Z = (Zt)t≥0 is a standard Brownian motion.
We denote by ht the firm’s position in the futures contracts (measured in dollar). The
dynamics of cash reserves with futures hedging are then given by:
dMt = (r − λ)Mtdt+ dXt + dEt
p
− dΦt − dLt + htσY dZt. (32)
Equation (32) shows that an important aspect of hedging with derivatives contracts is that it
produces additional short-term cash flows (htσY dZt). Asset substitution does not have this
feature. As a result, cash holdings and financing frictions will be important in determining
whether firms manage their risks by using derivatives contracts or by changing asset exposure
to permanent and transitory shocks.
4.1 Risk management with derivatives
We start our analysis by considering an environment in which hedging is costless (or uncon-
strained) in that there are no requirements of maintaining a margin account. Suppose first
that the firm manages only transitory shocks using futures contracts (by the firm’s choice
or because only futures correlated with transitory shocks are available). Let χT denote the
correlation between Zt and W
T
t (Zt and W
P
t are uncorrelated here). Using the same steps
as above, it is immediate to show that the value of an active firm that engages in risk
management satisfies in the earnings retention region:















h2σ2Y Vmm (a,m) + 2χT
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Defining shareholders’ scaled value function as F (c) ≡ V (a,m)
a
, we have that F satisfies:
(r − µ)F (c) = (α + c(r − λ− µ) )F ′(c) + 1
2
(σ2Ac














where g = h
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Substituting (35) in (34) then yields





with Σ(c) = σ2Ac
2 − 2ρσAσXc + σ2X − χ2Tσ2X(1 − ρ2) > 0 for ρ ∈ [−1, 1), which implies that
F is concave and, in turn, that equation (35) gives the optimal hedge ratio.
Suppose next that the firm manages only its exposure to permanent shocks. Let χP
denote the correlation with between Zt and W
P
t (Zt and W
T
t are uncorrelated here). In this
case, firm value satisfies in the earnings retention region:















h2σ2Y Vmm (a,m) + 2χPρhσY σXaVmm (a,m) + 2χPhσY σAaVam (a,m)
}
.
This in turn implies that the scaled value function F (c) satisfies
(r − µ)F (c) = (α +c(r − λ− µ))F ′(c) + 1
2
(σ2Ac









2 + 2σXσY χPρg − 2cσAσY χPg)F ′′(c)
}
. (38)
14The firm in our model hedges cash flows with expected profitability At so this denominator of a hedge
ratio follows the usual practice in risk management literature (see e.g. Tufano (1996)).
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(ρσX − cσA). (39)
Substituting the expression for g∗P in (38) yields





where Σ(c) = σ2Ac
2 − 2ρσAσXc + σ2X − χ2P (σAc − σXρ)2 > 0 for ρ ∈ [−1, 1), which implies
that F is concave and, in turn, that equation (39) defines the optimal dynamic hedging.
Equations (35) and (39) show that the signs of the hedge ratios are opposite to the signs of
the volatilities associated to transitory and permanent shocks in the dynamics of scaled cash
holdings (see equation (16)). The optimal hedging policy with respect to transitory shocks
is expected and known; see for example Bolton, Chen, and Wang (2011). The hedge ratio
with respect to transitory shocks is constant. The firm takes a position in future contracts
that is opposite to its core risk exposure and eliminates all the correlated risk.
The optimal hedging policy with respect to permanent shocks is new and more surprising.
Substituting the expression for h∗P ≡ ag∗P in (32) shows that optimal hedging of permanent
shocks adds two terms to the dynamics of cash reserves. The first one, −χPρσXAtdZt, serves
to remove the correlated risk from firm cash flows. The second one, χPσAMtdZt, is specific
to hedging of permanent shocks and has a double impact. First, it increases the volatility
of cash flows. Second, it increases the correlation of cash flow shocks. In other words, the
two opposing effects of a positive permanent shock discussed in section 2 are again at work.
Consequently, risk management of permanent shocks may imply long or short positions in





when χP > 0 the short position dominates for c < ρ
σX
σA
while the long position dominates for
c > ρσX
σA
. The long position dominates in particular if the correlation between short-term and
permanent cash flow shocks ρ is low and if the firm is relatively cash rich (high c). Therefore,
despite the concavity of the scaled value function, risk management of permanent shocks with
derivatives may imply a position that is not opposed but aligned with the exposure. This is
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due to the fact that hedging increases both cash flow volatility and the correlation of cash
flow shocks. As discussed above, the firm benefits from the correlation between shocks, i.e.
from generating liquidity when long-term prospects improve.15
In summary, hedging policies with respect to transitory and permanent shocks are markedly
different. The hedge ratio with respect to transitory shocks is constant while the hedge ratio
with respect to permanent shocks is linear in scaled cash holdings c. Furthermore, the signs
of the optimal hedge ratios g∗T and g
∗
P can be opposite. Our analysis has focused for clarity
on hedging positions with respect to one source of risk. If the futures price is correlated with
both W T and W P , as is likely to be the case, the optimal hedge ratio is simply g∗ = g∗T +g
∗
P .
Consider for example a primary commodity producer. The literature stresses that commod-
ity prices are subject to transitory and permanent shocks and emphasizes the importance
of precautionary savings and hedging in the primary commodity producing sector (see for
instance Reinhart and Wickham (1994)). Our study suggests that hedging policies in com-
modities markets should vary with the relative importance of firms’ exposure to permanent
and transitory shocks, i.e. with the nature of the shocks affecting these commodity prices.
How does hedging affect optimal policies? To answer this question, we solve our model
with and without hedging and compare optimal policies. If perfect hedging is possible, in
that χT = χP = 1, then the firm can decrease target cash holdings by as much as 89.1% with
hedging of transitory shocks and by 8.5% with hedging of permanent shocks. The optimal
size of equity issues decreases by 85.2% with hedging of transitory shocks and by 3.2% with
hedging of permanent risk. That is, if the availability of futures contracts is symmetric for
the two types of shocks, hedging of transitory shocks has a more significant effect on other
firm policies than hedging of permanent shocks. If futures are less perfectly correlated with
cash flows, the effects are naturally smaller but the pattern remains the same. Taking more
realistic correlations of χT = χP = 0.7, target cash holdings decrease by 34.2% (resp. 4.2%)
with hedging of transitory (resp. permanent) shocks. Equity issuance size decreases now by
28.7% (resp. 1.5%) with hedging of transitory (resp. permanent) shocks.
15The positive sign in g∗P stems from the positive sign of Vam = − caF ′′ as opposed to the negative signs of
Vaa and Vmm. This positive sign implies that the marginal value of cash increases in profitability. Note also
that it would be misleading to call the firm’s risk management policy to permanent shocks as “speculation,”
since taking a position that is not contrary to the exposure actually reduces risk.
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Lastly, suppose that hedging positions are not unbounded but are instead constrained
by the requirement of maintaining a margin account. Specifically, assume that the firm’s
net futures position cannot exceed the amount on the margin account by more than a
factor pi. Assuming that the margin account earns the same interest as the common cash
account, all cash holdings can be moved to the margin account if needed, so that the margin-
account constraint is equivalent to limiting the futures position to a pi multiple of cash
holdings, or |ht| ≤ piMt. In terms of hedge ratio, the constraint can then be written as
|gt| ≤ piCt. In such environments, constrained firms (i.e. firms with low c) hedge less due to
difficulties with meeting margin requirements, consistent with the evidence in Rampini, Sufi,
and Viswanathan (2014) that collateral constraints play a major role in risk management.
4.2 Hedging using derivatives versus asset substitution
An alternative to risk management using derivatives is to change the firm’s assets to achieve a
different exposure to transitory or permanent shocks. This is a version of asset substitution.
An important difference between asset substitution and hedging with derivatives is that the
former does not generate cash flows. Whether risk management generates cash flows or not
is not important in models with unconstrained financing (like Leland (1998)), but this is
relevant in a model with financing frictions like ours (see also Mello and Parsons (2000)).
Suppose that the firm can manage costlessly its asset risk via unconstrained selection of
volatilities of short-term or permanent shocks, σX and σA. Consider first short-term shocks.
The discussion below equation (25) suggests that the usual effect of σX on (scaled) firm
value is negative and so the optimal policy is to set σX = 0. This shows that the outcome
of derivative hedging and asset risk management are the same: The firm aims at removing
all exposure to short-term shocks and the two methods are equivalent.
Consider next permanent shocks. Using (26), we have that the first-order derivative of
firm value with respect to σA is always negative if ρ ≤ 0. In these instances, it is optimal to
set σA = 0. If instead ρ > 0, the optimal exposure σA to the permanent shock W
P satisfies:
σA = ρσX/c. (40)
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Plugging the expression for σA in the volatility of scaled cash holdings, we get a resulting
volatility given by σX
√
1− ρ2. Two observations are in order. First, the firm is willing to
maintain a positive volatility of permanent shocks. In essence, this happens because volatility
of scaled cash holding c is not the lowest at σA = 0 but when σA is at a right proportion
to σX , ρ, and c such that (40) holds. Second, the optimal volatility of permanent shocks
is large when c is small. A high σA contributes to the volatility of c positively and directly
by changing the volatility of permanent shocks, via σ2Ac
2, and indirectly via the covariance
term, 2ρσAσXc. If c is low, the direct volatility effect, being quadratic in c, is dwarfed by the
covariance term. By selecting a high exposure to permanent shocks σA, the firm can benefit
from the increased covariance with little cost of increased variance.
Managing permanent risk with either derivatives or asset substitution typically increases
beneficial correlation at the cost of an increased volatility. The difference between derivatives
and asset risk management is that the former manipulates short-term cash flow volatility and
the latter affects long-term asset-profitability volatility. This implies that the two strategies
have different incentives with varying c for a financially constrained firm. For example,
derivative hedging looses some of its potential when a firm is financially weaker, i.e. when
c is low. A firm with little cash, cannot afford to generate cash flow shocks to benefit from
an increased covariance between cash flow shocks, as this would put it at risk of running
out of cash quickly. By contrast, a distressed firm would have strong incentives to engage
in asset substitution to increase σA. That is, we predict that if a firm was mostly exposed
to permanent shocks, this firm should decrease its derivatives usage and potentially increase
its asset risk as it approaches distress, i.e. as its liquid reserves decrease.
5 Credit lines
Another way for firms to manage their risks is to acquire financial flexibility via a credit line.
Suppose that the firm has access to a credit line that allows it to borrow from creditors up
to some collateral constraint. In our model, the value of the firm’s assets at any time t > 0
is given by At. It is thus natural to consider a constraint of the type Mt ≥ −κAt for some
positive constant κ, as in Bolton, Chen, and Wang (2011). The logic behind this assumption
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is that the firm must be able to post collateral to secure a credit line. We may thus interpret
κAt as the firm’s short-term debt capacity. For simplicity, we treat κ as exogenous.
Introducing financial leverage and collateral constraints in the model implies an important
additional effect of permanent shocks. Notably, a positive permanent shock increases the
value of assets and therefore relaxes the collateral constraint, allowing the firm to cope with
larger transitory shocks. This effect works in the opposite direction from the effect described
in section 2 above, in which a permanent shock made the firm more constrained.16
Assuming that the firm pays a spread ξ > 0 over the risk-free rate to access credit, it
will optimally avoid using its credit line before exhausting internal funds. When running
out of cash, the firm will first use its credit line and, as long as the spread ξ is not too high,
it will exhaust the credit line before raising equity.17 Since the collateral constraint scales
with At, similar derivations as above show that when the credit line is the marginal source
of financing (i.e. when c < 0), the scaled value function F (c) satisfies:
(r − µ)F (c) = (α + c(r + ξ − µ))F ′(c) + 1
2
(σ2Ac
2 − 2ρσAσXc+ σ2X)F ′′(c), (41)
which is solved subject to




(F (c)− p (c+ κ+ φ)) ; ωα
r − µ − κ
)
, (42)
when the firm exhausts the credit line. When refinancing at c = −κ is optimal, scaled
cash holdings after refinancing cL are given by the solution to F
′(cL) = p. In the earnings
16Note that if in addition to this credit line the firm had some debt outstanding, a positive permanent
shock would not only increase the firm’s debt capacity via the credit line but also make the firm less levered.
We thank an anonymous referee for making this point and encouraging us to write this section.
17To see why the firm always first relies on the credit line, assume for simplicity that there is no fixed cost
of raising equity so that φ = 0. Given a sufficiently deep credit line, when is it optimal to issue equity? The
firm issues equity only when c ≤ 0 and at the optimal threshold c, it holds that F ′(c) = p and F ′′(c) = 0.
Suppose now that it is optimal to issue equity at c = 0 rather than use the credit line so that c = 0. The
above two conditions then imply F (0) = pα/(r − µ) > FFB(0), which cannot be. Another question that
naturally arises is whether it is optimal for the firm to use all of its credit line before issuing equity. For
any set of parameters, we can find a (non-positive) threshold c such that the firm optimally issues equity
whenever c < c irrespective of the limit of the credit line. At the optimal c, firm value satisfies value-matching
and smooth-pasting conditions: F (c) = F (c) − p(c − c + φ) and F ′(c) = p, where we have assumed that
φ > 0. If the level of indebtedness that triggers optimal equity issuance (−c) exceeds the limit of the credit
line (κ), the firm uses all of its credit line before raising equity. Otherwise, it issues equity before exhausting
the credit line. For the parameter values used in this section, we find that −c > κ.
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Credit line limit, κ
Notes. The left panel plots target cash holdings c∗L (solid curve) and the scaled issuance size cL+κ
(dashed curve) in the refinancing case. The right panel plots a change in firm value at c = 0 for
four values of the correlation between permanent and transitory shocks (ρ = 0.7 dashed-dotted,
ρ = 0.21 dashed, ρ = −0.21 solid, and ρ = −0.7 dotted). Parameter values are given in Table 1.
retention region (0, c∗L), the scaled value function satisfies (18), which is solved subject to
(20) and (21). Also, since cash flows are (piecewise) continuous, the scaled value function
F (c) is continuous and smooth everywhere, including at c = 0, implying that limc↓0 F (c) =
limc↑0 F (c), and limc↓0 F ′(c) = limc↑0 F ′(c). Lastly, in the region c ≥ c∗L, the firm pays out
any cash in excess of c∗L and we have F (c) = F (c
∗
L) + c− c∗L.
Figure 4 describes the effects of a credit line by varying κ in an environment characterized
by the same parameter values as in Table 1 and in which ξ = 1.5%, consistent with Sufi
(2009). The figure shows that an increase in the size of the credit line κ leads to a significant
decrease in the target level of cash holdings but has little effect on the optimal size of equity
issues. Figure 4 also shows that a credit line increases firm value by reducing refinancing
costs. Notably, even when the credit line is not drawn, an increase in the credit limit κ may
increase firm value by an amount close to that limit.
Interestingly, we also find that a firm with a credit line may respond differently to per-
manent shocks than a firm relying exclusively on cash reserves to absorb negative cash flow
shocks. This is due to the fact that the marginal value of cash increases in a if c > 0, in
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that Vam = − caF ′′(c) > 0, but it decreases in a if c < 0, in that Vam = − caF ′′(c) < 0.18
That is, cash-financed firms value additional cash more when asset productivity increases
while credit-financed firms value additional cash more when productivity decreases. This in
turn suggests that firms that benefit most from credit lines are those whose permanent and
transitory cash flow shocks are negatively correlated. The right panel of Figure 4 presents
an example in which we plot the benefit of a credit line (measured by the change in firm
value at c = 0 due to the credit line) for various values of ρ. The effects are large: a credit
line of 0.2 is worth 0.163 when ρ = −0.7 while the same credit line is worth only 0.106 when
ρ = 0.7. Thus our model predicts that credit lines should be more prevalent in firms and
industries in which permanent and transitory cash flow shocks are negatively correlated.
6 Investing in financially-constrained firms
Consider now the initial decision to invest in the firm. In the presence of transitory shocks
and financing frictions, the firm finds it optimal to hold cash after investment. Thus, solving
shareholders’ problem entails finding both the optimal time to invest τ as well as the optimal
initial level of cash reserves m0. Denote the value of the investment opportunity by G(a).





e−rτ (V (Aτ ,m0)− p(I +m0 + φAτ ))
]
. (43)
Following the literature on investment decisions under uncertainty (see Dixit and Pindyck
(1994)), it is natural to conjecture that the optimal investment strategy is to invest when
the value of the active firm exceeds the cost of investment by a sufficiently large margin. In
models without financing frictions, this margin reflects the value of postponing investment
until more information about asset productivity is available. In addition to this effect arising
from the irreversibility of the investment decision, our model incorporates a second friction:
Operating the asset may create temporary losses and financing these losses is costly.
Specifically, for any initial level of reserves, the investment policy takes a form of a barrier
policy whereby the firm invests as soon as asset productivity reaches some endogenous upper
18The scaled value function is concave for all c ∈ (κ, c∗) for the parameter values used in this section.
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barrier. Denote the optimal barrier by a∗. Investment is then undertaken the first time that
At is at or above a
∗. For any investment time τ , the optimal initial level of cash reserves m0,
if positive, must satisfy the first-order condition in problem (43). That is, we must have:
Vm(Aτ ,m0) = p. (44)
This is the same condition as the one used in equation (13) for optimal cash reserves after
refinancing. Thus, the initial level of cash reserves, if positive, is given by m0 = ca
∗.
Since the firm does not deliver any cash flow before investment, standard arguments
imply that the value of the investment opportunity G(a) satisfies for any a ∈ (0, a∗):





At the investment threshold, the value of the option to invest G(a) must equal the value of
an active firm minus the cost of acquiring the assets and the costs of raising the initial cash.
This requirement, together with m0 = m(a) = ca, yields the value-matching condition:
G(a∗) = a∗F (c)− pI − p(ca∗ + φa∗). (46)
Optimality of a∗ further requires that the slopes of the pre- and post-investment values are
equal when a = a∗. That is, G(a) satisfies the smooth-pasting condition:
G′(a∗) = F (c)− p(c+ φ). (47)
Solving shareholders’ optimization problem yields the following result.
Proposition 3. The following holds:
1. Suppose that the costs of external finance are low, in that F (0) > ωα/(r − µ). In this







(a∗F (0)− pI), ∀a ∈ (0, a∗),
aF (0)− pI, ∀a ≥ a∗,
(48)
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ξ = g(σA, µ) +
√
[g(σA, µ)]
2 + 2r/σ2P > 1, (50)
where g(σA, µ) =
1
2σ2A
(σ2A − 2µ). Investment is undertaken the first time that At ≥ a∗
and the firm’s cash reserves at the time of investment are given by m0 = ca
∗.
2. Suppose that the costs of external finance are high, in that F (0) = ωα/(r − µ).







(a∗(ωα/(r − µ)− pφ)− pI), ∀a ∈ (0, a∗),
a(ωα/(r − µ)− pφ)− pI, ∀a ≥ a∗,
(51)





ωα/(r − µ)− pφ, (52)
and ξ is defined in (50). Investment is undertaken the first time that At ≥ a∗. No
cash is raised in addition to I and it is optimal to liquidate right after investment.
(b) If ωα/(r − µ) ≤ pφ, the firm never invests and G(a) = 0, ∀a > 0.
As in standard real options models, Proposition 3 shows that, the value of the option
to invest is the product of two terms: The net present value of the project at the time of
investment, given by a∗F (0)− pI or a∗(ωα/(r − µ)− pφ)− pI, and the present value of $1





. When issuance costs are high, it
is either optimal to liquidate right after investment or to refrain from investing altogether.
Focusing on the more interesting case in which the costs of external finance are low,
one can note that when p = 1 and the firm cash flows are not subject to transitory shocks
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Table 2: Financing constraints and investment delay
Delay in investment % of the delay due to
Parameters due to financing constraints at-investment
(as % of a∗FB) constraints
1. σX = 0.12, λ = 0.02 8.0% 75.9%
2. σX = 0.15, λ = 0.03 9.6% 63.7%
3. σX = 0.09, λ = 0.01 6.8% 88.7%
Notes. Table 2 presents the quantitative effects of financing constraints on the investment threshold
and their decomposition. Input parameter values are given in Table 1.











r−µ . Equation (53) recovers the well-known investment threshold of
real options models (see e.g. Dixit and Pindyck (1994)). Except for two special cases (p = 1
and σX = 0 or p = 1 and φ = 0), F (0) is strictly lower than F
FB, so that the investment
threshold of Proposition 3 is strictly higher than the standard real options threshold. Our
results are therefore very different from those in prior studies, such as Boyle and Guthrie
(2003), in which firms face financing constraints when seeking to invest in new projects.
In such models, potential future financing constraints feed back in current policy choices
and encourage early investment. Our analysis highlights another way by which financing
frictions can distort investment behavior: The threat of future cash shortfalls increases
future financing costs and reduces the value of the asset underlying the firm’s growth option,
thereby leading to late exercise of the investment opportunity.
More generally, financing frictions have two separate effects on the timing of investment in
our model. First, they increase the cost of investment, thereby delaying investment. Second,
they reduce the value of an active firm, further delaying investment. Table 2 shows how
these two effects vary with input parameter values. In our base case environment, Case 1 in
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the table, financing frictions increase the investment threshold by 8.0% and three quarters
of the delay in investment is due to financing frictions at the time of investment. As shown
by the table, a firm with a higher volatility of transitory cash flow shocks (σX = 0.15) and
higher costs of holding cash (λ = 0.03) optimally invests at yet a higher threshold relative the
first-best, with more than one third of the delay coming from the post-investment financing
frictions. A firm with a relatively low cash flow volatility and low costs of holding cash (Case
3 in the table) invests at a lower threshold, but still much above the first-best threshold. In
this case, the bulk of the delay is due to financing frictions at investment.
7 Conclusion
Our paper contributes to the literature on the effects of financing frictions on corporate poli-
cies. Previous studies have focused on the uncertainty of cash flows as one of the important
determinants of liquidity and risk management policies. We demonstrate that these policies
can be better understood as arising from two separate types of shocks: permanent and tran-
sitory shocks to cash flows. The main distinction between permanent and transitory shocks
is that permanent shocks affect not only a firm’s immediate productivity and cash flows but
also its future productivity and cash flows. By contrast, while transitory shocks affect imme-
diate cash flows, they are uninformative about future expected profitability. To illustrate the
differential effects of these two types of shocks on corporate policies, we construct a dynamic
model of a firm facing financing frictions and subject to transitory and permanent cash flow
shocks. Using this model, we show that combining permanent and transitory shocks helps
explain corporate behavior and produces several novel implications about the level of cash
savings and optimal financing and risk management policies.
In our model, both permanent and transitory cash flow shocks induce the firm to save.
Optimal cash savings decrease with the correlation between permanent and transitory shocks.
This correlation is also a key driver of the cash-flow sensitivity of cash, which can be positive
or negative. In addition, when firms access capital markets to raise funds, the size of equity
issues is not constant as in prior models, but reflects the level and dynamics of permanent
shocks. We also show that introducing permanent shocks in models with financing frictions
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leads to richer risk management policies, that depend on the nature of the cash flow shocks.
In particular, we show that if the firm’s risk and futures prices are positively correlated, then
hedging transitory shocks involves a short futures position while hedging permanent shocks
may require a long futures position. We also show that managing risk either by derivatives or
by directly selecting the riskiness of assets via asset substitution leads to the same outcome
if the risk is due to transitory shocks. However, derivatives and asset substitution are
not equivalent when managing permanent shocks. Lastly, because the correlation between
permanent and transitory cash flow shocks reduces firm risk, we also find that the firms that
benefit most from credit lines are those in which these shocks are negatively correlated.
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Appendix
A. Proof of Proposition 1
The proof goes through three steps. Step 1 shows that problem (7) can be re-written as a
one-dimensional control problem. Step two solves the variational system (18), (19), (22).
Step 3 shows that the solution to (18), (19), (22) coincides with the solution of the one-
dimensional control problem and derives the optimal dividend and issuance policies. To
avoid confusion, throughout the proof, V ∗ and F ∗ denote the value functions of the control
problems while V and F denote the solution to the variational systems.









t }, ∀ t ≥ 0, (A1)
on (Ω,F). By Girsanov’s Theorem, (W˜ Pt ,W Tt )t≥0 with W˜ Pt = −σAt+W Pt , is a bi-dimensional
Brownian motion under the probability P˜. We have:
Proposition 4. The value function V ∗ of problem (7) satisfies





The function F ∗ is defined on [0,∞) by
F ∗(c) = sup
((τn)n≥1,(en)n≥1,L)∈A
f(c; (τn)n≥1, (en)n≥1, L), (A3)
with
f(c; (τn)n≥1, (en)n≥1, L) = EP˜c
[∫ τ0
0




and C0 = c with
























and the liquidation time τ0 is defined by
τ0 = inf{t ≥ 0 |Ct = 0}. (A9)
















































































































































































































Noting that E[e−rτ0 ωα
r−µAτ0 ] = aE
P˜[ ωα
r−µe






























where the admissible policies (τn)n≥1, (en)n≥1, L are related by














together with (A7), (A8) is equivalent to problem (A3)-(A8). 
The two next steps solve problem (A3). To this end, we solve first the variational system
(18), (19), (22) (step 2). Then, we show that its solution coincides with the solution of
problem (A3) (step 3).
Step 2 The following holds.
Proposition 5. There exists a unique solution (F, c∗) to the variational system (18), (19),
(22) that is concave and twice continuously differentiable over (0,∞).
The proof mimics the proof of Proposition A1 in De´camps, Mariotti, Rochet and Vil-
leneuve (DMRV) (2011). The arguments must be slightly adapted because, in the ordi-
nary differential equation (18), the drift (α + c(r − λ − µ)) can take negative values and
Σ(c) ≡ σ2Ac2 − 2ρσXσAc+ σ2X is non-constant. For completness, we develop below the main
steps of the proof with a particular focus on the arguments that require a slight adaptation.
We refer to DMRV (2011) for more details.
Proof of Proposition 5: We start by considering the family of ordinary differential equa-
tions parametrized by c1 > 0,
−(r − µ)F (c) + (α + c(r − λ− µ))F ′(c) + 1
2
(σ2Ac
2 − 2ρσXσAc+ σ2X)F
′′
(c) = 0,
0 < c < c1; (A12)
F ′(c1) = 1; (A13)
F
′′
(c1) = 0. (A14)
Because ρ ∈ [−1, 1), Σ(c) ≡ σ2Ac2 − 2ρσXσAc + σ2X > 0 and (A12)-(A14) admits a unique
solution Fc1 over [0, c1] for any c1 > 0. The next lemma establishes the monotonicity and
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concavity of Fc1 .
Lemma 1. The following holds:
(i) If 0 < λ ≤ r − µ then, for any c1 > 0, F ′c1 > 1 and F
′′
c1
< 0 over [0, c1).
(ii) If λ > r − µ then, for any 0 < c1 < αλ+µ−r , F ′c1 > 1 and F
′′
c1
< 0 over [0, c1).









(c1) > 0 because λ > 0. Since F
′′
c1
(c1) = 0 and F
′
c1
(c1) = 1, it follows that F
′′
c1
< 0 and thus
F ′c1 > 1 over some interval (c1 − ε, c1) where ε > 0. Now, suppose by way of contradiction
that F ′c1(c) ≤ 1 for some c ∈ [0, c1 − ε], and let c˜ = sup{c ∈ [0, c1 − ε] | F ′c1(c) ≤ 1} < c1.
Then, F ′c1(c˜) = 1 and F
′
c1





















To get (A15), remark that, by assumption, in each case (i) and (ii), we have α+(r−λ−µ)c > 0
for any c ∈ (c˜, c1). To conclude, note that (A16) contradicts the fact that F ′c1(c˜) = F ′c1(c1) =
1. Therefore F ′c1 > 1 over [0, c1), from which it follows that F
′′
c1
< 0 over [0, c1). 
If there exists a solution F to (18), (19), (22) that is twice continuously differentiable over
(0,∞), then, by construction, F must coincide over [0, c1] with some Fc1 , for an appropraite
choice of c1. This choice is dictated by the boundary condition (22) that F must satisfy at
zero. The next lemma studies the behavior of Fc1 and F
′
c1
at zero as c1 varies.
Lemma 2. In each of the two cases of Lemma 1, Fc1(0) is a strictly decreasing and concave
function of c1, whereas F
′
c1
(0) is a strictly increasing and convex function of c1.
Proof of Lemma 2: consider H0 and H1 the solutions to ODE
−(r − µ)H(c) + (α + c(r − λ− µ))H ′(c) + 1
2
(σ2Ac
2 − 2ρσXσAc+ σ2X)H
′′
(c) = 0
over [0,∞) characterized by the initial conditions H0(0) = 1, H ′0(0) = 0, H1(0) = 0, and




1 are strictly positive over (0,∞). The Wronskian WH0H1 ≡ H0H ′1 −
H1H
′
0 of H0 and H1 satisfies WH0H1(0) = 1 and
W ′H0H1(c) = −
2
Σ2(c)
(α + c(r − λ− µ))WH0H1 ,
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so that WH0H1 > 0 which implies that for each c1 > 0, Fc1 = Fc1(0)H0 +F
′
c1
(0)H1 over [0, c1].












































r−µ and limc1↓0 F
′
c1
(0) = 1 < p, it follows from Lemma 2
that there exists a unique cˆ1 > 0 such that Fcˆ1(0) =
ωα
r−µ , and that there exists a unique
c˜1 > 0 such that F
′
c˜1
(0) = p. Note that:
1. cˆ1 satisfies cˆ1 <
α
λ
(1−ω). Indeed, the concavity property implies Fc1(0) < Fc1(c1)− c1.
A computation yields Fc1(c1) − c1 ≤ ωαr−µ iff c1 ≥ αλ (1 − ω), (in the case λ > r − µ,
we have α
λ
(1 − ω) < α
λ+µ−r , and thus the assumption of assertion (ii) of lemma 1 is
satisfied).
2. cˆ1 > c˜1 if and only if F
′
cˆ1
(0) > p. Furthermore, Lemma 1 along with the fact that
F ′c1(c1) = 1 implies that if c1 ≥ c˜1, there exists a unique cp(c1) ∈ [0, c1) such that
F ′c1(cp(c1)) = p. This corresponds to the unique maximum over [0,∞) in case (i) of
Lemma 1, (resp. over [0, c1) in case (ii) of Lemma 1) of the function c 7→ Fc1(c)−p(c+φ).
By construction, we have that cp(c˜1) = 0.
The remaining of the proof of Proposition 5 coincides with the proof of Proposition A1 in
DMRV (2011). This leads to the two cases:
1. If F ′cˆ1(0) ≤ p, then (F, c∗) = (Fcˆ1 , cˆ1) solves the variational system (18), (19), (22).
Note that by construction F (0) = ωα
r−µ . We will say that issuance costs are high.
2. If F ′cˆ1(0) > p, then there exists a unique c
′
1 ∈ (c˜1, cˆ1) such that Fc′1(0) = Fc′1(cp(c′1)) −
p(cp(c
′
1) + φ). The pair (F, c
∗) = (Fc′1 , c
′
1) solves the variational system (18), (19), (22).
Lemma 2 along with c′1 < cˆ1 implies that F (0) >
ωα
r−µ . Furthermore, as c
′
1 > c˜1, the
function c 7→ F (c)− p(c + φ) reaches its maximum over [0,∞) at c¯ ≡ cp(c′1). We will
say that issuance costs are low.

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Step 3 We now show that the functions F ∗ and F coincide. The next Lemma states
that F is an upper bound for F ∗
Lemma 3. For any admissible policy ((τn)n≥1, (en)n≥1, L), the solution F to (18), (19), (22)
satisfies
F (c) ≥ f(c; (τn)n≥1, (en)n≥1, L); c > 0.
The proof of Lemma 3 is standard and follows from Lemma A4 in DMRV (2011). To
prove that F = F ∗, it thus remains to construct an admissible policy, the value of which
coincides with the function F . To this end, we consider the scaled cash reserve process C∗












c1{τ∗n≤t} − L∗t , (A17)







where the sequence of stopping times (τ ∗n)n≥1 is recursively defined by
τ ∗0 ≡ 0, τ ∗n ≡ inf {t > τ ∗n−1 |C∗t− = 0 and C∗t = c¯ > 0}; n ≥ 1, (A20)
with inf ∅ ≡ ∞ by convention. Standard results on the Skorokhod problem imply that there
exists a unique solution (C∗, L∗) to (A17)-(A20). Condition (A19) requires that cumulative
scaled dividends increase only when the scaled cash reserves reach the boundary c∗. Condi-
tions (A17)–(A18) show that this causes the scaled cash reserves to be reflected back at c∗.
Two cases can arise. If issuance costs are high, c¯ = 0 and the project is liquidated as soon
as C∗ drops to zero, so that τ ∗0 = inf {t ≥ 0 |C∗t− = 0} < ∞, P˜–almost surely. If issuance
costs are low, then c¯ = cp(c
∗) > 0, and the process C∗ discontinuously jumps to c¯ each time
it drops down to zero, so that τ ∗0 =∞, P˜–almost surely. This corresponds to a situation in
which, for any n ≥ 1, e∗ = F ∗(c¯)− F ∗(0) = p(c¯+ φ). Drawing on DMRV (2011), we obtain
Proposition 6. The value function F ∗ for problem (A3) coincides with the function F
solution to (18), (19), (22) that is twice continuously differentiable over (0,∞). The optimal




τ ∗n =∞, i∗n = 0; n ≥ 1
if issuance costs are high, and
τ ∗n = inf{t > τn−1 |C∗t− = 0}, e∗n = p(c¯+ φ); n ≥ 1
if issuance costs are low.
Finally, Proposition 6 together with Proposition 4 leads to Proposition 1.
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B. Comparative statics
To make the dependence of F , c, and c∗ on θ explicit, we write F = F (., θ), c = c(θ), and
c∗ = c∗(θ). Proposition 7 below and its corollaries establish Proposition 2.
Proposition 7. Let θ be one of the deep parameters of the model.
1. If issuance costs are high (liquidation case), then firm value satisfies
∂F
∂θ







F (C∗t , θ) +





















2. If issuance costs are low (refinancing case), then firm value satisfies
∂F
∂θ







































3. In both the liquidation and refinancing cases, the target level of cash holdings satisfies
dc∗(θ)
dθ















Using Proposition 7, we can measure the effects of the model parameters on the (scaled)
value of an active firm and the target level of liquid reserves.
Proof of Proposition 7: We prove case 2 (refinancing case). The proof of case 1 is similar.


























(C∗t− , θ)((σXρ− C∗t−σA)dW˜ Pt + σX
√
























for all T ≥ 0 and where the operator L is defined by
Lu(c) = (α + c(r − λ− µ))u′(c) + 1
2
(σ2P c
2 − 2ρσAσXc+ σ2X)u′′(c).
Let us consider each term of the right hand side of (A22). We deduce from (18) that the
first term of the right hand side (RHS) of (A22) satisfies
−(r − µ)∂F
∂θ




= −(r − µ)∂F
∂θ
(C∗t− , θ) + (α + C
∗
















F (C∗t− , θ)−

















(., θ) is bounded over (0, c∗(θ)], the third term of the RHS of (A22) is a
square integrable martingale. The fourth term is identically zero. Indeed, differentiat-
ing ∂F
∂c
(c∗(θ), θ) = 1 with respect to θ and using the fact that ∂F
2
∂c2
(c∗(θ), θ) = 0 yields
∂F 2
∂c∂θ
(c∗(θ), θ) = 0 which, together with (A19) implies the result. Lastly, because C∗ has























Taking expectations in (A22) yields
∂F
∂θ





F (C∗t− , θ) +









































= 0. Because, ∂
2F
∂c∂θ
(., θ) is bounded




(C∗T , θ) ≤ e−(r−µ)TK(1 + C∗T ) ≤ e−(r−µ)TK(1 + c∗(θ))
for all T , where K is a positive constant, and the third inequality follows from the fact that
C∗T ≤ c∗(θ) P almost surely, thus the result.
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Differentiating equation (24) of the main text with respect to θ yields (A21). 
B.1. Comparative statics: parameters σX, σA, ρ
Proposition 7 yields:
Corollary 1. For any p > 1 and φ > 0, for any c ∈ (0, c∗),
∂F
∂σX
(c, σX) = Ec
[∫ τ0
0








(c, σA) = Ec
[∫ τ0
0
























(c∗(θ), θ) for θ ∈ {σX , σA, ρ}. (A26)
Equations (A23)-(A26) hold in the liquidation case and the refinancing case.
Proof of Corollary 1. We recall that, in the refinancing case τ0 = ∞ a.e. The proof






(0, θ) = 0. (A27)
Equation (A27) results from differentiating F (0, θ) = F (c¯(θ), θ) − p(c¯(θ) + φ) with respect
to θ and using the fact that ∂F
∂c
(c¯(θ), θ) = p. 
B.2. Comparative statics: parameters p, φ






































(c∗(φ), φ) > 0.
Proof of Corollary 2. Direct implication of Proposition 7. 
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B.3. Comparative statics: parameters α, µ






















































Proof of Corollary 3. Note that equation (A27) holds for θ ∈ {α, µ}. Then formulas for
∂F
∂θ
(c, θ) and dc
∗(θ)
dθ
with θ ∈ {α, µ} follow from Proposition 7. Let us recall that ∂F
∂c
(c, θ) > 1
over [0, c∗) and C∗t ≤ c∗ P almost surely. Thus, ∂F∂α (c, α) > 0 and, for c ∈ [0, c∗), we have
∂F
∂α



















< 0. Together with the concavity of F with respect to c, it follows also
that, for all c ∈ [0, c∗),
F (c, µ)− c∂F
∂c
(c, µ) > F (c, µ)− c > 0,
which leads to ∂F
∂µ
(c, µ) > 0. Noting that c −→ F (c, µ)− c∂F
∂c






























































































Proof of Corollary 4. Direct application of Proposition 7. 

















e−rτ (V (Aτ ,m0)− p(m0 + I)− pφAτ )|Fτ
]]
.
If issuance costs are low, then F (0) = maxc∈[0,∞)(F (c)−p(c+φ)) = F (c¯)−p(c¯+φ) > ωαr−µ
and the mapping m −→ V (At,m) − p(m + I) − pφAt reaches its maximum at m0 = c¯At.

















e−rτ (F (0)Aτ − pI)
]
.
Standard computations yield the result.
If issuance costs are high, then F (0) = ωα
r−µ and the mapping m −→ V (At,m) − p(m +
I) − pφAt is decreasing. Thus, no cash is raised at the time of investment (in addition to











e−rτ (F (0)− pφ)Aτ − pI)
]
.
If F (0) > pφ, then standard computations leads to (51). Clearly, if F (0) ≤ pφ, the option
value to invest is worthless 
53
References
Abel, A. 2015. Optimal debt and profitability in the tradeoff theory. Working paper, Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania.
Abel, A., and J. Eberly. 1994. A unified model of investment under uncertainty. American
Economic Review 84:1369–1384.
Almeida, H., M. Campello, and M. S. Weisbach. 2004. The cash flow sensitivity of cash.
Journal of Finance 59:1777–1804.
Bansal, R., R. Dittmar, and D. Kiku. 2008. Cointegration and consumption risks in asset
returns. Review of Financial Studies 22:1343–1375.
Beveridge, S., and C. Nelson. 1981. A new approach to decomposition of economic times
series into permanent and transitory components with particular attention to measurement
of the business cycle. Journal of Monetary Economics 7:151–174.
Biais, B., T. Mariotti, G. Plantin, and J. Rochet. 2007. Dynamic security design: Con-
vergence to continuous time and asset pricing implications. Review of Economic Studies
74:345–390.
Biais, B., T. Mariotti, and J. Rochet. 2013. Dynamic financial contracting. Advances in
Economics and Econometrics, Cambridge University Press pp. 125–171.
Blundell, R., L. Pistaferri, and I. Preston. 2008. Consumption inequality and partial insur-
ance. American Economic Review 98:1887–1921.
Boehmer, E., and J. Wu. 2013. Short selling and the price discovery process. Review of
Financial Studies 26:287–322.
Bolton, P., H. Chen, and N. Wang. 2011. A unified theory of Tobin’s q, corporate investment,
financing, and risk management. Journal of Finance 66:1545–1578.
Bolton, P., H. Chen, and N. Wang. 2013. Market timing, investment, and risk management.
Journal of Financial Economics 109:40–62.
Bolton, P., N. Wang, and J. Yang. 2015. Investment under uncertainty and the value of real
and financial flexibility. Working paper, Columbia University.
Boyle, G., and G. Guthrie. 2003. Investment, uncertainty, and liquidity. Journal of Finance
58:2143 – 2166.
Brennan, M., and A. Subrahmanyam. 1996. Market microstructure and asset pricing: On the
compensation for illiquidity in stock returns. Journal of Financial Economics 41:441–464.
Byun, S., V. Polkovnichenko, and M. Rebello. 2016. Corporate savings and investment with
transitory and persistent shocks. Working paper, University of Texas.
54
Carlson, M., A. Fisher, and R. Giammarino. 2006. Corporate investment and asset price dy-
namics: Implications for SEO event-studies and long-run performance. Journal of Finance
61:1009–1034.
Chang, X., S. Dasgupta, G. Wong, and J. Yao. 2014. Cash-flow sensitivities and the allocation
of internal cash flow. Review of Financial Studies 27:3628–3657.
Cocco, J., F. Gomes, and P. Maenhout. 2005. Consumption and portfolio choice over the
life cycle. Review of Financial Studies 18:491–533.
Cochrane, J. 1994. Permanent and transitory components of GNP and stock prices. Quarterly
Journal of Economics 109:241–265.
Cohen, R., P. Gompers, and T. Vuolteenaho. 2002. Who underreacts to cash-flow news? Ev-
idence from trading between individuals and institutions. Journal of Financial Economics
66:409–462.
De´camps, J.-P., T. Mariotti, J.-C. Rochet, and S. Villeneuve. 2011. Free cash flow, issuance
costs, and stock prices. Journal of Finance 66:1501–1544.
DeMarzo, P., M. Fishman, Z. He, and N. Wang. 2012. Dynamic agency and the q theory of
investment. Journal of Finance 67:2295–2340.
DeMarzo, P., and Y. Sannikov. 2006. Optimal security design and dynamic capital structure
in a continuous-time agency model. Journal of Finance 61:2681–2724.
Dixit, A. K., and R. S. Pindyck. 1994. Investment under Uncertainty. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Dumas, B. 1992. Super contact and related optimality conditions. Journal of Economic
Dynamics and Control 15:675–685.
Frankel, R., and L. Litov. 2009. Earnings persistence. Journal of Accounting and Economics
47:182–190.
Garleanu, N., L. Kogan, and S. Panageas. 2012a. Displacement risk and asset returns.
Journal of Financial Economics 105:491–510.
Garleanu, N., S. Panageas, and J. Yu. 2012b. Technological growth and asset pricing. Journal
of Finance 67:1265–1292.
Glosten, L., and L. Harris. 1988. Estimating the components of the bid/ask spread. Journal
of Financial Economics 21:123–142.
Glover, B. 2016. The expected cost of default. Journal of Financial Economics 119:284–299.
Goldstein, R., N. Ju, and H. Leland. 2001. An EBIT-based model of dynamic capital
structure. Journal of Business 74:483–512.
55
Gorbenko, A. S., and I. A. Strebulaev. 2010. Temporary versus permanent shocks: Explain-
ing corporate financial policies. Review of Financial Studies 23:2591–2647.
Gottschalk, P., and R. Moffitt. 2009. The rising instability of U.S. earnings. Journal of
Economic Perspectives 23:3–24.
Grenadier, S. R., and A. Malenko. 2010. A Bayesian approach to real options: The case of
distinguishing between temporary and permanent shocks. Journal of Finance 65:1949–
1986.
Grenadier, S. R., and A. Malenko. 2011. Real options signaling games with applications to
corporate finance. Review of Financial Studies 24:3393–4036.
Gryglewicz, S. 2011. A theory of corporate financial decisions with liquidity and solvency
concerns. Journal of Financial Economics 99:365–384.
Guiso, L., L. Pistaferri, and F. Schivardi. 2005. Insurance within the firm. Journal of Political
Economy 113:1054–1087.
Hackbarth, D., J. Miao, and E. Morellec. 2006. Capital structure, credit risk, and macroe-
conomic conditions. Journal of Financial Economics 82:519–550.
Hamilton, J. 1994. Time Series Analysis. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
He, Z. 2009. Optimal executive compensation when firm size follows a geometric brownian
motion. Review of Financial Studies 22:859–892.
Hugonnier, J., S. Malamud, and E. Morellec. 2015. Capital supply uncertainty, cash holdings,
and investment. Review of Financial Studies 28:391–445.
Kogan, L., and D. Papanikolaou. 2013. Firm characteristics and stock returns: The role of
investment-specific shocks. Review of Financial Studies 26:2718–2759.
Kogan, L., and D. Papanikolaou. 2014. Growth opportunities, technology shocks, and asset
prices. Journal of Finance 69:675–718.
Lambrecht, B. 2004. The timing and terms of mergers motivated by economies of scale.
Journal of Financial Economics 72:41–62.
Lee, B.-S., and O. M. Rui. 2007. Time-series behavior of share repurchases and dividends.
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 42:119–142.
Leland, H. E. 1998. Agency costs, risk management, and capital structure. Journal of
Finance 53:1213–1243.
Manso, G. 2008. Investment reversibility and the agency cost of debt. Econometrica 76:437–
442.
McDonald, R., and J. Siegel. 1986. The value of waiting to invest. Quarterly Journal of
Economics 101:707–728.
56
Meghir, C., and L. Pistaferri. 2004. Income variance dynamics and heterogeneity. Econo-
metrica 72:1–32.
Mello, A., and J. Parsons. 2000. Hedging and liquidity. Review of Financial Studies 13:127–
153.
Mirantes, A., J. Poblacion, and G. Serna. 2015. Commodity derivative valuation under
a factor model with time-varying market prices of risk. Review of Derivatives Research
18:75–93.
Morellec, E., B. Nikolov, and N. Schu¨rhoff. 2012. Corporate governance and capital structure
dynamics. Journal of Finance 67:803–848.
Morellec, E., and N. Schu¨rhoff. 2011. Corporate investment and financing under asymmetric
information. Journal of Financial Economics 99:262–288.
Moreno-Bromberg, S., and J.-C. Rochet. 2014. Market frictions and corporate finance: An
overview paper. Mathematics and Financial Economics 8:355–381.
Opler, T., L. Pinkowitz, R. Stulz, and R. Williamson. 1999. The determinants and implica-
tions of corporate cash holdings. Journal of Financial Economics 52:3–46.
Rampini, A., A. Sufi, and S. Viswanathan. 2014. Dynamic risk management. Journal of
Financial Economics 111:271–296.
Reinhart, C., and P. Wickham. 1994. Commodity prices: Cyclical weakness or secular
decline? IMF Staff Papers 41:175–213.
Riddick, L., and T. Whited. 2009. The corporate propensity to save. Journal of Finance
64:1729–1766.
Schwartz, E., and J. Smith. 2000. Short-term variations and long-term dynamics in com-
modity prices. Management Science 46:893–911.
Stokey, N. 2009. The Economics of Inaction. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Strebulaev, I., and T. Whited. 2012. Dynamic models and structural estimation in corporate
finance. Foundations and Trends in Finance 6:1–163.
Strebulaev, I. A. 2007. Do tests of capital structure theory mean what they say? Journal
of Finance 62:1747–1787.
Sufi, A. 2009. Bank lines of credit in corporate finance: An empirical analysis. Review of
Financial Studies 22:1057–1088.
Tufano, P. 1996. Who manages risk? An empirical examination of risk management practices
in the gold mining industry. Journal of Finance 51:1097–1137.
57
